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1. Introduction
Amajor accomplishment of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations in creating
the World Trade Organization (WTO) was the introduction of new dispute set-
tlement procedures. These procedures were intended to provide a significant step
forward, relative to GATT, in the settling of trade disputes, in large part by en-
suring that violations of WTO commitments would be met with swift retaliation
(“suspension of concessions”) by the affected trading partners. While the dispute
settlement procedures of the WTO indeed represent a considerable improvement
over those in GATT, nine years of experience under the new procedures suggests
that significant problems of enforcement remain in the WTO.
One prominent problem with the WTO dispute settlement procedures is the
practical difficulty faced by small and developing countries in finding the capacity
to effectively retaliate against trading partners that are in violation of their WTO
commitments. The difficulty is that, even if a small or developing country wins a
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the World Trade Forum 2003 for helpful comments. Bagwell and Staiger thank the National
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ruling against a trading partner under the WTO dispute settlement procedures,
and is therefore authorized to retaliate in the event that the trading partner does
not bring its policies into conformity with its WTO obligations, the country may
have little ability to bring teeth to the ruling with effective retaliation. As a
consequence, many small and developing countries voice frustration with their
ability to negotiate meaningful commitments with trading partners in the WTO.1
This problem persists from the GATT era. As Hudek (2000) details, the
1965 developing country proposals on remedies included a proposal for “collective
retaliation” in cases where a large country violated its obligations to a developing
country. Under this proposal, the retaliation threat would be more effective, since
a large-country defendant would be faced with the possibility that its exports
would suffer a loss of access to markets in multiple countries. Developed countries
objected to the proposal for collective retaliation, however, and it was not adopted.
More recently, the frustration of small and developing countries has been ex-
pressed with particular force by Mexico, which has proposed in the WTO (WTO,
2002) a number of changes to the dispute settlement procedures in order to ad-
dress this problem. Among the changes proposed by Mexico is that the right
of retaliation be made “tradeable.” The idea is that, if a country wins a ruling
against a trading partner under the WTO dispute settlement procedures, and
finds that it is unable or unwilling to retaliate itself, it should be able to trade
that right to another country that would value and utilize the right of retaliation.
In Mexico’s view, “...this concept might help address the specific problem facing
Members that are unable to suspend concessions effectively.” (WTO, 2002, p. 6).
The problem confronting small and developing countries admits two interpreta-
tions. A first interpretation is dismissive. It emphasizes that many GATT/WTO
obligations are reciprocal in nature. If a country received the benefit of a negoti-
ated tariff reduction from its trading partner, then it may be expected that the
country offered the benefit to its trading partner of a reduction in its own tariff.
But if a country had the ability to offer such a benefit, then it likewise has the
ability to achieve effective retaliation by withdrawing this benefit. According to
this perspective, the problem of ineffective retaliation would arise only for those
countries that anyway had little to offer in negotiations. A second interpretation is
1Bown (2004a,b) reports empirical results that are consistent with the argument that retalia-
tion is less effective for such countries. Likewise, in other work (Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger,
2004), we examine all disputes brought to the WTO since its inception (January 1, 1995) and
report consistent evidence. For example, we do not find any dispute in which a developing coun-
try (defined here as a non-OECD member) has imposed countermeasures to induce compliance
even when faced with non-implementation.
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accommodative. It emphasizes that the welfare of small and developing countries
may be of particular interest to the world community. It also stresses that small
and developing countries may value heavily the growth of their export industries;
consequently, such a country may be unable to use a retaliatory tariff increase to
impose a reciprocal (i.e., commensurate) cost on a developed country, should the
latter violate its GATT/WTO obligations and restrict access to its market.
We see merit in both interpretations and do not advocate one over the other.
We do believe, however, that the accommodative interpretation is sufficiently
compelling to motivate exploratory formal analyses of the proposed changes to
dispute settlement procedures. In this regard, we note that Maggi (1999) has
already provided a theoretical framework with which to understand the potential
benefits of collective retaliation. He shows that governments may be better able
to enforce efficiency-enhancing trade agreements, if a third country is allowed
to retaliate when a trade dispute arises between two other countries. We are
unaware, however, of any prior analysis of the recent proposal that retaliation
rights be tradeable.
In this paper, we initiate the analytical exploration of tradeable retaliation
rights by considering the case for auctioning countermeasures in the WTO. This
exploration is novel from the perspective of the theory of trade agreements, where
threatened retaliation plays a central role in enforcement, but where auctioning
retaliation rights has not been considered.2 From the perspective of auction the-
ory, retaliation rights within the WTO exhibit some interesting features as well,
because retaliation implies a rich pattern of both positive and negative external-
ities across trading partners. Recent work in the auction literature has focused
on environments with externalities, and the case of auctioning countermeasures
in the WTO can be viewed as a novel and interesting environment within which
to extend the study of auctions with externalities.3
To undertake our analysis, we adopt a simple model in which two foreign
countries import a common good from an exporting home country. We assume
that each country has bound its tariffs in some previous GATT/WTO negotiation,
that the home country has violated its WTO commitments, and that some other
(unmodeled) country has been granted a right of retaliation against the home
2See, for example, Bagwell and Staiger (1990, 1997), Dixit (1987), Ederington (2001), Maggi
(1999) and Limao (2000). Bagwell and Staiger (2002, Chapter 6) provide a recent review of the
existing literature on enforcement of trade agreements.
3As discussed below, our formal analysis is most closely related to that of Jehiel and
Moldovanu (2000). Other important contributions in this literature include Das Varma (2002),
Ettinger (2002), Haile (2000) and Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996, 2001).
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country but is unwilling or unable to exercise this right with a retaliatory tariff
of its own. With this country as the “seller,” we then consider the implications of
allowing the seller to sell the right of retaliation in a first-price sealed-bid auction.
We consider two different auction designs. In our basic auction, we allow the two
foreign countries to bid for the right to retaliate against the home country, but we
do not allow the home country to bid in order to retire this right of retaliation.
In our extended auction, we permit the home country to bid as well.
We assume that the two foreign countries experience privately observed political-
economy shocks that determine their valuation of the right to impose a higher
tariff. In our basic auction, the two foreign countries are the only bidders, and
we show that this is an auction with positive externalities: each foreign country
would prefer that the other foreign country win the auction and retaliate against
the home country over the alternative that no country wins the auction and no
retaliation is imposed. Intuitively, both foreign countries enjoy a more favorable
terms of trade (i.e., a reduced world price for the home-country export) when
retaliation by either foreign country is imposed.4 We show further that whether a
foreign country would in fact prefer to win the right of retaliation over the alter-
native that the other foreign country wins this right depends on the realization of
its privately observed political-economy shock. Intuitively, the more favorable for-
eign terms of trade is enjoyed in either event, but the import-competing producers
in the winning country enjoy as well the benefits of additional tariff protection at
the expense of consumers in that country. Thus, a foreign country that is suffi-
ciently politically motivated - and therefore values the implied redistribution from
its consumers to its import-competing producers to a sufficient degree - prefers
to win rather than lose to the other foreign country. Together, as we establish
below, these features lead the basic auction to exhibit several unusual properties,
including the possibility of misallocation of the retaliation right across the foreign
countries and even outright auction failure, in which no bids are made despite
positive valuation by the bidders.
When we extend the basic auction to permit the home country to bid to retire
the right of retaliation against it, we show that both positive and negative exter-
nalities arise among bidders. While each foreign country continues to impose a
positive externality on the other foreign country if it wins the auction as compared
to the alternative in which no country wins and the retaliation right is retired,
4See Bown and Crowley (2004a,b) and Chang and Winters (2001) for evidence consistent
with the hypothesis that a tariff increase by one country may generate a positive terms-of-trade
externality for another country that imports the relevant good.
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each foreign country imposes a negative externality on the home country if it wins.
We show that in this extended auction there can be no auction failure, and indeed
the home country always wins and retires the retaliation right. Intuitively, the
home country incurs the full cost of retaliation, while retaliation is a public good
among the foreign countries; thus, the home country has the greatest incentive to
win the auction.
Our analysis of the extended auction contributes to an on-going policy de-
bate about the role of cash payments in WTO dispute settlement procedures. In
particular, it is sometimes argued that these procedures should be modified, so
that retaliatory tariffs are not used and instead the violating country provides an
appropriate cash payment to the harmed country. But it is not clear that such an
arrangement would always be credible: What would happen if the harmed country
is small and the violating country refuses to make the cash payment? Our analysis
of the extended auction suggests that a cash payment from the home (violating)
country to the seller (the harmed country) becomes credible in this circumstance,
when the seller offers the right of retaliation in an auction. Intuitively, the home
country then understands that if it does not win the auction and make the corre-
sponding cash payment, a (large) foreign country will win the auction and impose
a tariff on home-country exports. Thus, the threat of a retaliatory foreign tariff
induces the home country to offer actual cash compensation.
We next make normative comparisons across these two auctions on the basis
of two criteria. First, in line with the traditional auction literature, we compare
the expected revenue across the two auctions, and we further develop the nor-
mative motivation for this criterion within the WTO-retaliation-auction context.
We find that this first criterion favors the extended auction over the basic auc-
tion, as the greatest expected revenue is generated when the home country is
permitted to bid to retire the right of retaliation. Second, we compare ex-ante
efficiency across the two auctions, where ex-ante efficiency is defined according to
the objective functions of the affected governments. We develop the normative
motivation for this second criterion as well, and we demonstrate that it can lead
to normative conclusions about the wisdom of permitting home to bid that differ
from those reached under the expected revenue criterion. A general implication
of our analysis is then that the desirability of key auction design features depends
critically on what is perceived to be the purpose of introducing auctions in the
WTO-retaliation setting.
At a broader level, our analysis suggests that auctioning retaliation rights in
the WTO could yield a number of potential indirect benefits for the WTO system.
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While these indirect benefits are not present in our formal analysis, they include
the prospect of greater compliance with WTO obligations that would be raised by
providing even small WTO members with the ability to credibly threaten retal-
iatory action (under the basic auction) or the extraction of compensation (under
the extended auction) in the event of WTO violations by their larger trading part-
ners. Also included is the possibility that the prospect of auction revenue might
be used by a small developing country to attract and finance private legal sup-
port for WTO legal actions that it otherwise could not afford to initiate. Against
these additional unmodeled potential benefits would have to be weighed several
unmodeled potential costs, such as the possibility that the revenue generated by
auctions could result in excessive use of the WTO dispute settlement system.
Finally, we note that our formal analysis is closely related to that of Jehiel and
Moldovanu (2000). They consider second-price sealed-bid auctions with external-
ities and derive a number of interesting results. Among these, they construct
an equilibrium for a general family of payoffs that exhibit positive externalities.
In our analysis of the basic auction, we feature an analogous equilibrium.5 In
this context, the novel aspects of our analysis are: we develop a new trade-policy
application, focus on first-price sealed-bid auctions, characterize the necessary
properties of equilibrium behavior and thereby establish that the constructed
equilibrium is unique, and analyze as well an extended auction wherein bidders
are asymmetric and both positive and negative externalities exist.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the economic
model. The basic auction is defined in Section 3, and the equilibrium bids and
revenue are characterized in Section 4. Section 5 defines the extended auction,
and Section 6 characterizes the equilibrium bids and revenue in this extended
auction. Section 7 compares the two auctions from the perspective of expected
revenue and ex-ante efficiency. Section 8 concludes. More technical proofs are
contained in the Appendix.
5Haile (2000) considers a second-price sealed-bid auction with positive externalities, in which
bidders have noisy signals of their private values at the time of the auction and the positive
externalities are driven by resale opportunities. In this specific setting, he constructs the unique
symmetric equilibrium for a range of binding reserve prices that lie sufficiently below the highest
possible valuation. While the particular setting that we analyze is quite different, the equilibrium
of our basic auction and that derived by Haile have analogous features, though our results apply
to reserve prices up to the highest possible valuation.
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2. Model
In this section, we develop the economic framework that underlies our analysis.
We present a three-country model, in which two symmetric foreign countries (*1
and *2) import a single good from Home. In subsequent sections, we analyze
auctions in which the foreign countries bid for the right to retaliate against Home
on this good; therefore, we refer to this good as the “retaliation good.” Our goal in
the present section is to develop an economic model of the retaliation-good sector,
define the corresponding welfare functions for governments, and characterize best-
response, Nash and efficient tariffs.
2.1. Economic Model
The economic model of the retaliation-good sector is simple. For each foreign
country j = 1, 2, let demand and supply be given as D∗(P ∗j) = 1 − P ∗j and
Q∗(P ∗j) = 1/4, where P ∗j is the local price of the retaliation good in foreign
country j. In the Home country, there is a larger endowment (supply) of this
good, but no demand: D(P ) = 0 and Q(P ) = 1/2, where P is the local price
of the retaliation good in the Home country. It is convenient to define foreign
country j0s import demand function and Home’s export supply function:
M∗(P ∗j) = D∗(P ∗j)−Q∗(P ∗j) = 3/4− P ∗j (2.1)
E(P ) = Q(P )−D(P ) = 1/2
Notice that Home exports 1/2 units, regardless of the local price.
Under free trade, we have P ∗1 = P ∗2 = P, and so global demand and supply
equal when 2[1−P ] = 1. Thus, the free-trade local price is P ∗1 = P ∗2 = P = 1/2.
Each foreign country thus imports 1/4 units, with Home exporting 1/2 units.
We now allow that each foreign country imposes an import tariff. Let τ ∗j
denote foreign country j’s specific tariff. For simplicity, we assume that Home
has no export policy. Thus, the world price, Pw, for the retaliation good must
agree with Home’s local price: P = Pw. The local price in foreign country j, by
contrast, is given as
P ∗j = Pw + τ ∗j. (2.2)
We require as well that the market for the retaliation good clears:
M∗(P ∗1) +M∗(P ∗2) = E(Pw). (2.3)
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Using (2.2), we may solve (2.3) for the equilibrium world price, ePw(τ ∗1, τ ∗2), which
is given as
ePw(τ ∗1, τ ∗2) = 1− τ ∗1 − τ ∗2
2
. (2.4)
Using (2.2) and (2.4), we find that the equilibrium local price in foreign country
j, which we denote as bP ∗j(τ ∗j, ePw), is given as
bP ∗j(τ ∗j, ePw) ≡ ePw(τ ∗1, τ ∗2) + τ ∗j = 1− τ ∗i + τ ∗j
2
, (2.5)
where i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. For simplicity, we assume throughout that τ ∗j ≤ 1.
2.2. Welfare Functions
We consider next the welfare functions of the governments of the various countries,
with regard to trade in the retaliation-good sector. In line with recent work,
we allow that a government is motivated by both national-income and political-
economy (i.e., distributional) concerns.6
Formally, we represent the welfare function for the government of foreign coun-
try j as
W ∗j( bP ∗j, ePw) = 1Z
bP∗j
(1− P ∗j)dP ∗j + ζ∗jΠ∗( bP ∗j) + [ bP ∗j − ePw]M∗( bP ∗j) (2.6)
where the first term is consumer surplus, the second term is profit weighted by a
political-economy parameter, ζ∗j, and the third term is tariff revenue. All of the
various functions are defined above, except for foreign country j’s profit, which is
defined as
Π∗(P ∗j) ≡ P ∗j(1/4). (2.7)
As (2.6) reveals, the government of foreign country j experiences a welfare benefit
from the world-price reduction (i.e., terms-of-trade improvement) that an increase
in any import tariff implies.
6For discussion of this literature, see Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002 Chapter 2). The
formulation that we adopt here is analogous to those used by Bagwell and Staiger (2001) and
Baldwin (1987).
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With respect to the political-economy parameter, we assume:
A1: For each j ∈ {1, 2}, ζ∗j ∈ [1, 2].
Notice that the government of foreign country j maximizes national income when
ζ∗j = 1. Otherwise, the government weighs the profit of import-competing firms
above consumer surplus and tariff revenue.
It is convenient to express the welfare function in a simplified manner. Writing
welfare as a function of prices, we find that
W ∗j( bP ∗j, ePw) = 1/2 + (1/4) bP ∗j[ζ∗j − 1]− (1/2)( bP ∗j)2 − ePw(3/4− bP ∗j). (2.8)
Likewise, using (2.4) and (2.5), we find that welfare can be defined as a direct
function of tariffs,
cW ∗j(τ ∗j, τ ∗i) ≡W ∗j( bP ∗j(τ ∗j, ePw(τ ∗1, τ ∗2)), ePw(τ ∗1, τ ∗2)),
and then written as
cW ∗j(τ ∗j, τ ∗i) = (1 + ζ∗j) + ζ∗jτ ∗j − 3(τ ∗j)2 + 2τ ∗iτ ∗j + [2− ζ∗j]τ ∗i + (τ ∗i)2
8
.
(2.9)
We consider next the welfare of Home. Letting ζH denote the political-
economy parameter for Home, we define Home’s welfare, W ( ePw), as
W ( ePw) = ζH(1/2) ePw. (2.10)
Thus, Home weighs the profit of its export sector, (1/2) ePw, by a political-economy
parameter, ζH . Observe that Home suffers a welfare loss, when foreign tariffs are
increased and the world price declines.
Maintaining symmetry with A1, we make the following assumption:
A2: ζH ∈ [1, 2].
This assumption plays no role in the analysis until Sections 5-7.
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2.3. Best-Response and Nash Tariffs
With the foreign country welfare functions defined, it is now straightforward to
characterize non-cooperative tariffs. In particular, we now derive the best-response
(optimal) and Nash tariffs.
The best-response function can be found by using (2.8) and setting
W ∗jbP∗j d
bP ∗j
dτ ∗j +W
∗jePw ∂
ePw
∂τ ∗j = 0.
As this expression reveals, when the government of foreign country j selects its
optimal tariff, it considers the impact of the tariff on the local price and the world
price. To find the best-response tariff, we may equivalently use (2.9) and set
∂cW∗j
∂τ∗j = 0. We find that the best-response tariff function, τ
∗j
R (τ ∗i), is given by
τ ∗jR (τ ∗i) =
ζ∗j + 2τ ∗i
6
. (2.11)
Notice that the best-response function is upward sloping. This is because the
two foreign countries are competing importers: as the tariff of one foreign country
rises, more volume is diverted to the other foreign country, and the latter country
thus greets the higher volume with a greater tariff as it thereby achieves a large
welfare gain from the consequent terms-of-trade improvement.7
We next consider foreign country j’s Nash tariff, τ ∗jN , which is defined by
τ ∗jR (τ ∗iN) = τ
∗j
N . It is straightforward to derive that
τ ∗jN =
3ζ∗j + ζ∗i
16
. (2.12)
We observe that τ ∗jN < 1/2 under A1. It is interesting to observe further that
τ ∗jN − τ ∗iN = (1/8)[ζ∗j − ζ∗i].
The foreign country with the higher political-economy parameter thus sets the
higher Nash tariff, as it has greater incentive to raise the local price - and thus
the profit of the import-competing sector. Figure 1 illustrates the best-response
and Nash tariffs.
7Bagwell and Staiger (1997) examine a related “competing importer” model and likewise find
that import tariffs are strategic complements. See also Maggi (1999).
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2.4. Efficient Tariffs
We now characterize efficient tariffs, where efficiency is measured relative to the
welfare functions of the three governments.8 This characterization clarifies further
the central features of our model. In addition, this characterization is useful in
Section 7, when we discuss the implications of different auction formats using an
efficiency criterion.
A special but convenient feature of our economic model is that Home always
exports 1/2 units. Thus, foreign tariffs do not restrict trade in an aggregate sense;
rather, tariffs influence the allocation of the fixed volume of Home exports across
the foreign countries. This structure is advantageous for two reasons. First, it
aligns the model with those used in the auction literature, where a single unit of
a good is allocated over bidders. In subsequent sections, we are thus able to build
on techniques used in the auction literature. Second, while it is well understood
that tariffs may impact efficiency by altering the overall volume of trade, it is less
well appreciated that tariffs also may enhance efficiency by allocating a greater
share of aggregate trade volume to the importing country whose government most
values trade (i.e., to the foreign country whose government weighs least heavily
the interests of import-competing firms). This latter role is most easily seen when
there is a fixed volume of trade to allocate.
To characterize the efficiency frontier, we begin by deriving the politically
optimal tariffs. As discussed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001, 2002), a gov-
ernment’s politically optimal tariff is that tariff which would be optimal, if gov-
ernments were not motivated by the terms-of-trade implications of their trade
policies. In other words, when a government chooses its politically optimal tar-
iff, it achieves its preferred local price. Formally, the politically optimal tariff
for foreign country j satisfies W ∗jbP∗j = 0. Using (2.5) and (2.8), we find that the
politically optimal tariff, τ ∗jPO, is given by
τ ∗jPO = (1/4)[ζ
∗j − 1]. (2.13)
We note that the politically optimal tariff is free trade, when the political-economy
parameter is unity (corresponding to national income maximization). We note,
too, that under A1 foreign country j’s Nash tariff must exceed its politically
optimal tariff: τ ∗jN > τ
∗j
PO. This is natural, since foreign country j is motivated by
terms-of-trade considerations when setting its Nash tariff.
8The WTO is an agreement among governments, and we thus analyze the efficiency of this
agreement relative to the preferences of governments. For further discussion, see Bagwell and
Staiger (1999, 2001, 2002 Chapter 2).
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We turn now to the efficiency frontier. Define joint welfare by
J(τ ∗1, τ ∗2) =W ( ePw) +W ∗1( bP ∗1, ePw) +W ∗2( bP ∗2, ePw).
When ζH = 1, the world price cancels from this sum, being entirely associated
with the redistribution between Home export profit and foreign tariff revenue.9 If
ζH 6= 1, then the world price would again cancel from J, if Home had its own export
policy, since the world price would then be associated with the redistribution of
tariff revenue between Home and the foreign countries. But when Home does
not have its own export policy, ePw is also associated with Home’s local price (i.e.,
export profit), and so ePw does not cancel from J unless ζH = 1 (so that movements
from Home export profit to foreign tariff revenue is entirely redistributive).
For our present purposes, it is sufficient to examine the efficiency frontier when
ζH = 1. We then find that
J(τ ∗1, τ ∗2) = 1 + (1/4) bP ∗1[ζ∗1 − 1]− (1/2)( bP ∗1)2 + (1/4) bP ∗2[ζ∗2 − 1]− (1/2)( bP ∗2)2.
Setting ∂J∂τ∗1 = 0, we find that efficient tariffs, (τ
∗1
E , τ ∗2E ), satisfy
τ ∗1E − τ ∗2E = (1/4)[ζ∗1 − ζ∗2]. (2.14)
It may be confirmed that (2.14) also arises when J is maximized with respect to
τ ∗2. Thus, (2.14) characterizes the set of efficient tariffs when ζH = 1. Notice that
the politically optimal tariffs are efficient.
As Figure 2 illustrates, the efficiency frontier is upward sloping. This is, of
course, unusual, but it must be remembered that our model is constructed so
that tariffs cannot reduce the aggregate volume of trade. Instead, efficiency in
our model is all about the allocation of a fixed volume of trade across foreign
countries. If foreign country 1 has a higher political-economy parameter than
does foreign country 2 (i.e., if ζ∗1 > ζ∗2), then it is efficient for foreign country
1 to have a higher local price and thus greater profit in the import-competing
sector. This is accomplished by allowing foreign country 1 to select a higher
tariff, as (2.14) confirms.
Along the efficiency frontier, the foreign tariff differential is maintained. Of
course, at higher tariff pairs along the frontier, the world price is lower, and so
movements along the efficiency frontier correspond to redistributions from Home
9Formally, this conclusion follows from (2.1), (2.3), (2.6) and (2.10).
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to the foreign countries. But how is the efficient tariff differential determined? At
a given world price (i.e., for a given sum of tariffs, τ ∗1 + τ ∗2), efficiency requires
that the particular tariffs (τ ∗1 and τ ∗2) maximize the joint welfare of the foreign
countries. This amounts to choosing the best local price pair ( bP ∗1, bP ∗2), given
the fixed world price. This choice involves a tradeoff. First, as discussed above,
when political-economy differences are present across foreign countries, the welfare
benefit of greater profit in the import-competing sector is larger in the foreign
country with the higher political-economy parameter. This force suggests that
local prices should vary across foreign countries. Second, the joint consumer
surplus and tariff revenue of foreign countries is maximized when local prices are
equal across foreign countries. For a given world price, the efficient local price
ratio thus represents a balance between the two considerations.
Why isn’t the Nash equilibrium efficient? As Figure 2 illustrates, when ζ∗j >
ζ∗i, the Nash equilibrium entails tariffs for which the tariff differential, τ ∗j−τ ∗i, is
smaller than would be efficient. Intuitively, when foreign country i raises its tariff,
it does not internalize the fact that a greater share of imports is then diverted
to foreign country j, whose local price (and thus profit) falls as a result. When
ζ∗j > ζ∗i, this leads foreign country i to “under-value” the redistributive effect
(on profit, across foreign countries) of its tariff increase on foreign country welfare
for any given world price. By contrast, when ζ∗j = ζ∗i, there is no efficiency basis
to seek a redistribution of profit from one foreign country to another, and so the
Nash equilibrium is efficient.
3. The Basic Auction: Definition and Payoffs
In this section, we define and interpret our basic auction. After identifying the
different outcomes that may arise in this auction, we characterize and interpret
the payoffs that are associated with these outcomes.
3.1. Definition
Our basic auction is a first-price sealed-bid auction, where the two foreign coun-
tries are the bidders. Each of the two foreign countries is privately informed of
the value of its political-economy parameter, where these parameters, ζ∗1 and ζ∗2,
are independently and identically distributed according to a well-behaved (twice-
continuously differentiable) distribution function, F (ζ∗j), over the support [1, 2],
with the density function given as f = F 0. After observing ζ∗j, foreign country
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j makes a monetary bid for the right to retaliate. The foreign countries select
their bids simultaneously. The bids are selected from the set {N}∪ [bo,∞), where
N corresponds to a decision to “not bid” and bo ≥ 0 is the reserve price for the
auction. A case of particular interest is bo = 0, in which case the auction has
no reserve price. If both countries make a bid (i.e., neither selects N), then the
right of retaliation goes to the high bidder, with each foreign country having an
equal chance of gaining the right of retaliation in case of a tie. If one foreign
country makes a bid and the other does not, then the right of retaliation goes to
the former. Finally, if neither foreign country makes a bid (i.e., both select N),
then the right of retaliation is not assigned, and so no retaliation transpires.
What does retaliation mean? As discussed in the Introduction, we imagine
that Home has violated its WTO obligations against some country, but that this
country elects not to retaliate on its own. Instead, the harmed country conducts
an auction for the right to retaliate against Home. In our basic auction, we assume
that two foreign countries bid for the right to retaliate against Home. We now
suppose that, through prior negotiations with Home, the two foreign countries
have agreed to set their tariffs on the retaliation good at τ o ≡ τ ∗1o = τ ∗2o ≥ 0.
If a foreign country obtains the right of retaliation, then it is permitted to raise
its tariff on the retaliation good to the higher value, τ o +∆, where ∆ > 0. The
size of ∆ is interpreted as reflecting the size of Home’s original violation.10 Here,
we do not model the nature of Home’s original violation, or the selection of the
retaliation good, though these are obviously important subjects for discussion
and future analysis. Given this focus and the assumed symmetry of the foreign
countries, we can regard ∆ as an exogenous number that characterizes the extent
of permitted retaliation by the winner (if any) of the auction.
We are interested in the case in which any winner of the auction would, in fact,
10Under GATT/WTO rules, when it is found that a country has violated its obligations (e.g.,
by selecting a tariff above the level to which it had agreed), if the offending and harmed countries
cannot agree upon “compensation” (e.g., the offending country may offer tariff reductions on
other goods that it imports), then the harmed country is authorized to retaliate (e.g., the
harmed country may raise its own tariffs), where the level of retaliation is determined as that
which restores the original balance of concessions. Working with a general-equilibrium model,
Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001, 2002) show that the balance of concessions is restored when
the retaliatory action is of a magnitude that restores the offending country’s original terms of
trade (i.e., the ratio of the price of its export good to its import good on world markets). We
consider here the possibility that the harmed country may hold an auction for retaliation of
this size. GATT/WTO rules further provide that the retaliation must later be removed if the
original violation is later removed, and so more generally we may think of the harmed country
as auctioning the per-period rental of the right to retaliate.
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choose to carry out the retaliation. Intuitively, we may imagine that Home and
the foreign countries have negotiated lower tariffs over time, with the status quo
being that each now sets its tariff below its reaction curve. Each foreign country
would thus enjoy a small tariff hike, if such a hike did not induce a higher Home
tariff on some (unmodeled) good that the foreign country exports to Home.11 Our
focus here is on the auction of retaliation rights, and so we do not put forth a
repeated-game model with which to endogenize the status quo tariffs. Using A1,
however, we do know that a small retaliation would be carried out if the initial
tariffs entail free trade or are politically optimal, for example. More generally, we
impose the following assumption:
A3: τ o ≥ 0, ∆ > 0 and τ o +∆ < 1/6.
This assumption implies that τ o+∆ is always below each foreign country’s reaction
curve, since under A1 we have that 1/6 ≤ ζ∗j/6 = min
τ∗i
τ ∗jR (τ ∗i). Thus, under A1
and A3, when a foreign country wins the right to retaliate, it will exercise this
right, regardless of the current realization of its political-economy parameter.12
3.2. Payoffs
From foreign country j’s perspective, there are three possible outcomes: it may
“win” the auction, in which case τ ∗j = τ o + ∆ and τ ∗i = τ o; it may “lose” the
11Our model does not provide an efficiency rationale for an agreement between Home and the
foreign countries to lower tariffs. First, we do not model the good (or goods) that the foreign
countries export to Home. Second, with regard to the good that Home exports, we have assumed
that the total export volume is fixed, so that efficiency concerns only the allocation of this volume
across foreign countries. As Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001, 2002) show, however, in more
general settings, efficiency enhancing trade agreements must entail reciprocal tariff reductions.
Motivated by this general finding and by the actual nature of trade-policy negotiations, we thus
assume that the initial tariffs are below the respective reaction curves, so that each foreign
country would carry out a small retaliation.
12In the context of a larger game in which the status quo tariffs are endogenized, it is natural
to associate our model with a later stage that follows the negotiation of the status quo tariffs.
After this negotiation is completed, the respective countries may experience political-economy
shocks. Such a shock may, for example, motivate Home to violate its agreement. Likewise,
the foreign countries receive political-economy shocks that may alter the benefit of a unilateral
tariff hike. From this perspective, A3 means that the political-economy parameter for a foreign
country would never drop (as compared to its level at the time of the original negotiation) to
such an extent that the appeal of a unilateral tariff hike would be lost. This discussion provides
some additional context within which to consider our analysis, but we emphasize that such a
game would require a separate analysis and is well beyond the reach of the present paper.
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auction, in which case τ ∗j = τ o and τ ∗i = τ o+∆; or it may be that “nothing” hap-
pens (no country wins the auction), in which case τ ∗j = τ ∗i = τ o. The respective
(gross) payoffs to foreign country j from these three outcomes are:
ω(ζ∗j) ≡ cW ∗j(τ o +∆, τ o; ζ∗j) (3.1)
λ(ζ∗j) ≡ cW ∗j(τ o, τ o +∆; ζ∗j)
η(ζ∗j) ≡ cW ∗j(τ o, τ o; ζ∗j),
where we now explicitly represent the dependence of welfare on the political-
economy parameter.
We now characterize these payoffs. Our first claim is that each foreign country
prefers retaliation to nothing, whether that country wins or loses:
Lemma 3.1: ω(ζ∗j) > η(ζ∗j) and λ(ζ∗j) > η(ζ∗j).
Proof: We find that
ω(ζ∗j)− η(ζ∗j) = cW ∗j(τ o +∆, τ o; ζ∗j)−cW ∗j(τ o, τ o; ζ∗j) (3.2)
=
∆
8
{ζ∗j − 4τ o − 3∆} > 0,
where the inequality uses A1 (ζ∗j ≥ 1) and A3 (∆ > 0, τ o +∆ < 1/6).
Likewise, we find that
λ(ζ∗j)− η(ζ∗j) = cW ∗j(τ o, τ o +∆; ζ∗j)−cW ∗j(τ o, τ o; ζ∗j) (3.3)
=
∆
8
{4τ o + 2− ζ∗j +∆} > 0,
where the inequality uses A1 (ζ∗j ≤ 2) and A3 (τ o ≥ 0, ∆ > 0). Q.E.D.
Intuitively, provided that some foreign country wins the auction, retaliation
will occur and the resulting reduction in the world price affords a terms-of-trade
benefit to both foreign countries. The political-economy parameter cannot be too
small (i.e., we use ζ∗j ≥ 1), else the winning country might prefer the lower local
price that comes with no retaliation; and the political-economy parameter also
cannot be too large (i.e., we use ζ∗j ≤ 2), else the losing country might prefer
no retaliation to the low local price that occurs upon losing and thus absorbing
diverted trade volume. Under A1, however, there is no ambiguity: the foreign
countries agree that someone should retaliate.
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But might there be a free-riding problem? This seems plausible if a foreign
country would rather lose than win. In this case, retaliation has the aspect of a
public good among the foreign countries. Intuitively, whether a foreign country
wins or loses, it obtains the benefit of a lower world price. The difference between
the two outcomes rests with the local price. If foreign country j wins, then it
imposes the retaliatory tariff and obtains a higher local price; whereas, if foreign
country j loses, then it absorbs diverted trade volume, and its local price thus
drops. Given that the world price is the same in either outcome, the comparison
thus boils down to whether foreign country j prefers the higher local price that
comes with winning or the lower local price that comes with losing. Now, foreign
country j’s preferred local price comes about when its tariff is set at its politically
optimal level, τ ∗jPO. This discussion thus suggests that foreign country j prefers to
win rather than lose if τ o +∆ is “closer” to τ ∗jPO than is τ o.
We now report our formal finding and then return to confirm its relationship
to the intuitive discussion just presented:
Lemma 3.2: Let ζ∗jc ∈ (1, 2) be defined by
ζ∗c = 4[τ o +
∆
2
] + 1. (3.4)
Then
sign{ω(ζ∗j)− λ(ζ∗j)} = sign{ζ∗j − ζ∗c}.
Proof: To establish this result, we use (3.2) and (3.3) and observe that
ω(ζ∗j)− λ(ζ∗j) = [ω(ζ∗j)− η(ζ∗j)] + [η(ζ∗j)− λ(ζ∗j)]
=
∆
4
{ζ∗j − 1− 4τ o − 2∆},
so that
ω(ζ∗j)− λ(ζ∗j)
∆
=
ζ∗j − 1
4
− (τ o +
∆
2
). (3.5)
The lemma now follows by simple rearrangement. Q.E.D.
We now consider further the relationship of this finding to the informal dis-
cussion above. Observe that
τ ∗jPO − τ o =
ζ∗j − 1
4
− τ o
τ o +∆− τ ∗jPO = τ o +∆−
ζ∗j − 1
4
,
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so that τ o is “closer” to τ ∗jPO than is τ o+∆ if and only if τ
∗j
PO−τ o < τ o+∆−τ
∗j
PO,
which is in turn true if and only if ζ∗j < ζ∗c . Thus, our informal discussion indicates
that when ζ∗j < ζ∗c , foreign country j would rather lose (select τ o) than win (select
τ o +∆). But of course this is just what our formal lemma says as well.
We now consider the relationships between the three payoffs in some further
detail. Using (2.9) and (3.1), we find the following explicit expressions:
ω(ζ∗j) = (1 + ζ
∗j) + ζ∗j(τ o +∆)− 3(τ o +∆)2 − 2τ o(τ o +∆) + (2− ζ∗j)τ o + (τ o)2
8
λ(ζ∗j) = (1 + ζ
∗j) + ζ∗jτ o − 3(τ o)2 + 2τ o(τ o +∆) + (2− ζ∗j)(τ o +∆) + (τ o +∆)2
8
η(ζ∗j) = (1 + ζ
∗j) + 2τ o
8
Using these explicit payoffs, it is straightforward to confirm the following:
Lemma 3.3: The slopes of ω(ζ∗j), λ(ζ∗j) and η(ζ∗j) are positive and satisfy:
ω0(ζ∗j) = 1 +∆
8
> η0(ζ∗j) = 1
8
> λ0(ζ∗j) = 1−∆
8
. (3.6)
This important lemma is illustrated in Figure 3 and captures a simple idea.
When the foreign country wins, its local price is higher, and so its import-
competing industry earns greater profit. This is especially valuable when the
government places a greater welfare weight on these profits. Thus, ω(ζ∗j) in-
creases swiftly with the political-economy parameter. By contrast, when the
foreign country loses, the resulting reduction in the local price works to reduce
profit in the import-competing industry and is thus particularly painful when
the political-economy parameter is large. It follows that λ(ζ∗j) increases slowly
with the political-economy parameter. Finally, if no retaliation occurs, then the
foreign country’s payoff rises with the political-economy parameter at an interme-
diate speed, corresponding to the direct effect of a higher weight on profit.
Finally, we note that the basic auction is an auction with positive externalities:
by Lemma 3.1, any foreign country j prefers that foreign country i win the auction
to the situation in which neither foreign country wins the auction (i.e., λ(ζ∗j) >
η(ζ∗j)). This is because retaliation is a public good among the foreign countries.
Both countries benefit from the diminished world price that retaliation implies. As
we show in the next section, the presence of a positive externality across bidders
has interesting implications for equilibrium bids and revenue.
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4. The Basic Auction: Equilibrium Bids and Revenue
In this section, we characterize the symmetric (Bayes-Nash) equilibria of the basic
auction. Such an equilibrium is described by a bidding function, b(ζ∗j), that maps
from [1, 2] into {N} ∪ [bo,∞). We present necessary and sufficient conditions for
symmetric equilibria, and we thereby establish the existence of a unique symmetric
equilibrium. We also characterize the seller’s expected revenue and show that the
optimal reserve bid is positive. All omitted proofs are found in the Appendix.
Throughout, we maintain the assumption that bo is sufficiently small, in that
it lies below the highest possible valuation for winning versus losing:
A4: ω(2)− bo > λ(2).
This assumption ensures that the net benefit of winning exceeds that of losing,
at least for the highest type. Of course, A4 is satisfied when bo = 0. We observe
further that ω(1)− bo > η(1) is sufficient for A4.13
4.1. Necessary Conditions
We begin with the necessary characteristics of a symmetric equilibrium. Our first
result establishes the monotonicity of any equilibrium bidding function.
Lemma 4.1: (Monotonicity) In any symmetric equilibrium, if ζ∗jB > ζ
∗j
S and
b(ζ∗jS ) 6= N, then (i). b(ζ∗jB ) 6= N and (ii). b(ζ∗jB ) ≥ b(ζ∗jS ).
Thus, in any symmetric equilibrium, if a type bids, then any higher type must
bid, too, and in fact the higher type chooses a weakly higher bid.
With the monotonicity result at hand, we now report that “auction failure” is
a feature of any symmetric equilibrium:
Lemma 4.2: (Auction Failure) In any symmetric equilibrium, B < 1, where B ≡
prob{b(ζ∗j) 6= N}.
Proof: Fix a symmetric equilibrium. Suppose B = 1. Let ρ(ζ∗j) denote the
probability that a foreign firm of type ζ∗j wins the auction with the bid b(ζ∗j).
By Lemma 4.1, the bid function is (weakly) increasing over the support [1, 2].
13If ω(1)− bo > η(1), then using (3.5) and (3.2) we have ω(2)− λ(2)− bo > (ω(2)− λ(2))−
(ω(1)− η(1)) = ∆2 {14 − τo − ∆4 } > 0.
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Consider a small interval I of types just above 1. For any ζ∗j ∈ I, ρ(ζ∗j) > 0.
Thus, for any ζ∗j ∈ I, a strict gain could be achieved by deviating to N, since
λ(ζ∗j) > ρ(ζ∗j)[ω(ζ∗j)− b(ζ∗j)] + (1− ρ(ζ∗j))λ(ζ∗j)
follows from ρ(ζ∗j) > 0, λ(1) > ω(1), and b(ζ∗j) ≥ bo ≥ 0. This contradicts B = 1.
Q.E.D.
This lemma holds even when bo = 0. Intuitively, if all types were to bid, then the
lower types would do better yet by not bidding, since they could then be sure to
lose whereas bidding runs a small risk of winning.
Our monotonicity and auction-failure findings imply a simple characterization
of the types that do not bid:
Lemma 4.3: In any symmetric equilibrium, there exists ζ∗L ∈ (1, 2) such that
b(ζ∗j) = N for all ζ∗j < ζ∗L, and b(ζ∗j) 6= N for all ζ∗j > ζ∗L.
Proof: By Lemma 4.2, we know that a positive measure of types do not bid.
Using Lemma 4.1, we know further that the set of such types must take the form
[1, ζ∗L), since once active bidding begins it continues for all higher types. Thus,
ζ∗L > 1. Now suppose that ζ∗L = 2, so that no types bid (B = 0). In this case, using
A4, a foreign country with type near ζ∗j = 2 would strictly gain by deviating and
bidding bo, since ω(2)− bo > λ(2) > η(2). Q.E.D.
We consider now features of the equilibrium bidding function for ζ∗j > ζ∗L.We
find that a region of pooling must exist:
Lemma 4.4: In any symmetric equilibrium, there exists ζ∗H ∈ (ζ∗L, 2) such that
b(ζ∗j) = bo for all ζ∗j ∈ (ζ∗L, ζ∗H) and b(ζ∗j) > bo for ζ∗j > ζ∗H .
Together with Lemma 4.3, this lemma indicates that lower types refrain from
bidding, intermediate types pool at the reserve bid, and higher types bid above
the reserve bid.
It is instructive here to sketch the proof. First, we show that it is not possible
for an interval of types to pool at some value eb > bo. If such a pooling bid were
posited, then all types on that interval could not be indifferent between winning
(with the bid eb) and losing; thus, it would be necessary that some type exists that
prefers to deviate to a slightly higher bid (thus winning more often) or to a slightly
lower bid (thus losing more often). By contrast, pooling at bo is possible, since a
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slightly lower bid is then not possible. Second, we show that an interval of types,
beginning at ζ∗L, must pool at the bid bo. Intuitively, if b were strictly increasing
over (ζ∗L, 2], then it would be necessary that type ζ∗L is indifferent between bidding
bo and not bidding: ω(ζ∗L)− bo = η(ζ∗L). But this implies that ω(ζ∗L)− bo < λ(ζ∗L),
and so types just above ζ∗L would gain from deviating to a lower bid (such as bo),
since they then benefit by losing more often (and pay less when winning). Third,
we show that the highest types are unwilling to pool at bo, since under A4 such
types would gain from deviating to a higher bid and winning more often.
We consider next the behavior of the bidding function for higher types, de-
scribed by ζ∗j ≥ ζ∗H .We find a region over which the bidding function is continuous
and strictly increasing:
Lemma 4.5: In any symmetric equilibrium, b(ζ∗H) = bo, b(ζ∗j) is continuous over
ζ∗j ∈ [ζ∗H , 2], and b(ζ∗j) is strictly increasing over ζ∗j ∈ (ζ∗H , 2].
Intuitively, higher types prefer winning to losing, and so such types bid aggres-
sively. Over this range, the equilibrium bidding function is thus strictly increasing,
just as it is in a standard first-price auction without externalities.
At this point, we have characterized the qualitative properties that the bidding
function must take in any symmetric equilibrium. Our next task is to characterize
the critical values, ζ∗L and ζ∗H . To this end, we proceed in two steps. First, we
define and characterize two key values for ζ∗j. Second, we show that these key
values correspond to ζ∗L and ζ∗H .
The two key values are denoted as ζ∗(bo) and eζ∗(bo). The value ζ∗(bo) is defined
as the solution to the following equation:
ω(ζ∗j)− λ(ζ∗j) = bo. (4.1)
This value is characterized as follows:
Lemma 4.6: ζ∗(bo) takes the following form:
ζ∗(bo) = 1 + 4τ o + 2∆+
4
∆
bo ∈ (1, 2). (4.2)
Given the definition of ζ∗ = ζ∗(bo) in (4.2), we define eζ∗(bo) as the solution to the
following equation:
(F (ζ∗)− F (ζ∗j))[λ(ζ
∗j)− (ω(ζ∗j)− bo)
2
] = F (ζ∗j)[ω(ζ∗j)− bo − η(ζ∗j)]. (4.3)
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We characterize this value as follows:
Lemma 4.7: eζ∗(bo) is uniquely defined, eζ∗(bo) ∈ (1, ζ∗(bo)) and deζ∗dbo > 0.
We proceed now to our second step and establish a relationship between the key
values, ζ∗(bo) and eζ∗(bo), and the necessary features of a symmetric equilibrium.
Lemma 4.8: In any symmetric equilibrium, ζ∗H = ζ
∗
(bo) and ζ∗L = eζ∗(bo).
To complete our characterization of the necessary features of a symmetric
equilibrium, we now derive the form that the bidding function takes over ζ∗j ∈
[ζ∗H , 2]. To this end, we fix ζ∗j and consider bζ∗j ∈ [ζ∗H , 2]. Suppose that foreign
country j has type ζ∗j and bids as if its type were bζ∗j. Given that the rival country
uses the equilibrium bidding function, the payoff to foreign country j is then
U(bζ∗j, ζ∗j) ≡ F (bζ∗j)[ω(ζ∗j)− b(bζ∗j)] + [1− F (bζ∗j)]λ(ζ∗j). (4.4)
With the monotonicity of b embedded, we observe this function satisfies the single-
crossing condition:
U12(bζ∗j, ζ∗j) = F 0(bζ∗j)[ω0(ζ∗j)− λ0(ζ∗j)] > 0. (4.5)
For our present purposes, the important point is that a symmetric equilibrium
exists only if the local incentive constraint is satisfied: for all ζ∗j ∈ [ζ∗H , 2],
U1(bζ∗j, ζ∗j) = 0 when bζ∗j = ζ∗j. (4.6)
Recalling from Lemma 4.8 that ζ∗H = ζ
∗
, it is now possible to use (4.6) to charac-
terize the necessary features of the bidding function for ζ∗j ∈ [ζ∗, 2].
Lemma 4.9: In any symmetric equilibrium, when foreign country j has type
ζ∗j ∈ [ζ∗, 2], it bids
b(ζ∗j) = ω(ζ∗j)− λ(ζ∗j)− ∆
4
1
F (ζ∗j)
ζ∗jZ
ζ
∗
F (x)dx.
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and expects to pay
F (ζ∗j)b(ζ∗j) = F (ζ∗j)[ω(ζ∗j)− λ(ζ∗j)]− ∆
4
ζ∗jZ
ζ
∗
F (x)dx.
Intuitively, this lemma has the familiar interpretation that a bidder in a first-price
auction “shades” the bid relative to the true valuation, once it is understood that
the bidder’s valuation over the range of focus corresponds to the value of winning
relative to losing, ω(ζ∗j)− λ(ζ∗j).
We may now summarize the various findings above into a single proposition
that states the necessary implications of a symmetric equilibrium:
Proposition 4.1: In any symmetric equilibrium,
(i). for all ζ∗j ∈ [1,eζ∗), b(ζ∗j) = N,
(ii). for all ζ∗j ∈ (eζ∗, ζ∗], b(ζ∗j) = bo, and
(iii). for all ζ∗j ∈ (ζ∗, 2], b(ζ∗j) is strictly increasing and given as
b(ζ∗j) = ω(ζ∗j)− λ(ζ∗j)− ∆
4
1
F (ζ∗j)
ζ∗jZ
ζ
∗
F (x)dx.
The values eζ∗ and ζ∗ depend upon bo and are defined by (4.3) and (4.1). They
satisfy ζ∗ ∈ (1, 2) and eζ∗ ∈ (1, ζ∗).
Figure 4 illustrates the bidding function.
4.2. Sufficient Conditions
With the necessary features now established, we turn last to sufficiency. In par-
ticular, we confirm that the stated bidding function does indeed constitute a
symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 4.2: The bidding function defined in Proposition 4.1 constitutes a
symmetric equilibrium.
The proof relies on the constructed indifference of types eζ∗and ζ∗, along with the
single-crossing property of U as captured in (4.5).
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Together, Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 indicate that we have now characterized
the unique symmetric equilibrium for our basic auction. Summarizing:
Corollary 4.1: For the basic auction, there exists a unique symmetric equilib-
rium. In this equilibrium, the governments of the foreign countries use the bidding
function defined in Proposition 4.1.
In auctions without externalities, the first-price auction is allocatively effi-
cient: the bidding function is strictly increasing, and so the highest-valuation
bidder always obtains the item. In the setting considered here, however, positive
externalities exist. We find that a first-price auction then no longer ensures that
retaliation is efficiently allocated: auction failure may result, so that no bidder
wins the right to retaliate; and even when bidding occurs, it may be that both for-
eign countries bid at the reserve price and the right of retaliation is misallocated.
On the other hand, when at least one foreign country has a high political-economy
parameter, then bidding is more aggressive and the auction allocates retaliation
across the foreign countries in an efficient manner.
4.3. Optimal Auctions
We now briefly consider the revenue-maximizing reserve bid for the seller. We
assume that the seller places no value on the right of retaliation and thus seeks
only to maximize expected revenue.14
We begin with a characterization of the seller’s expected revenue:
Lemma 4.10: In the symmetric equilibrium, the seller’s expected revenue is
2P (bo) = bo[F
2(ζ∗)− F 2(eζ∗)] + 2 2Z
ζ
∗
F (ζ∗j){[ω(ζ∗j)− λ(ζ∗j)]F 0(ζ∗j)− ∆
4
(1− F (ζ∗j))}dζ∗j.
With the expected revenue of the seller now characterized, we next analyze
the seller’s optimal reserve price. We find:
14If the seller has a positive valuation for the right of retaliation, then the natural interpreta-
tion is that the seller would impose retaliation on some export of Home in the event of auction
failure. This possibility might in turn affect the payoffs to the foreign countries when auction
failure occurs, as they might benefit from the seller’s retaliation effort. A full analysis of this
issue requires a larger model, in which the seller’s trading relationships are more fully treated.
We leave this to future work.
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Proposition 4.3: When the seller sets the reserve bid to maximize expected
revenue, the optimal reserve bid is positive.
This proposition establishes that the seller sets the reserve bid above the seller’s
own valuation for the item, which in the present setting is taken to be zero. When
the reserve bid is raised above zero, the possibility of auction failure increases
(recall that eζ∗(bo) is strictly increasing), but expected revenue rises since the
expected bid is then higher.
5. The Extended Auction: Definition and Payoffs
In this section, we define and interpret an extended auction, in which the foreign
countries and Home are all bidders. We then define and characterize Home’s
payoffs for the extended auction.
5.1. Definition
We now consider an extended auction, in which Home can bid to retire the right
of retaliation. In particular, Home places a bid at the same time that the foreign
countries make their respective bids, where the space of possible bids for each
country is {N} ∪ [bo,∞). If no country bids at or above bo, then no retaliation
occurs and no auction revenue is received. If some country does bid bo or more,
then the highest bidder wins the auction. In the event of a tie, the auction treats
foreign countries symmetrically, but we will allow that Home may be treated
differently than the foreign countries. For example, Home may win all ties.15 In
the event that Home wins, the right of retaliation is retired, and Home transfers
its bid to the seller. By contrast, if a foreign country wins the auction, then, as
in the basic auction, the winning foreign country retaliates and transfers its bid
to the seller. To keep our analysis tractable, we assume that Home’s political-
economy type is publicly known and constant at some value ζH ∈ [1, 2]. As in the
basic auction, the foreign countries’ respective types are privately known.
15Our results hold as well under the requirement that Home and foreign countries are treated
symmetrically when ties occur. By allowing that Home is treated differently in ties, we are able
to state a simple specification for equilibrium strategies.
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5.2. Payoffs
The payoffs to the foreign countries are defined as in the basic auction. We focus
here on Home’s payoff under the different outcomes (retaliation, no retaliation)
that may arise in the extended auction.
In the event that Home does not face retaliation (whether because both foreign
countries select N or Home bids more), we may use (2.4) to derive that the
equilibrium world price is
ePwNR ≡ ePw(τ o, τ o) = 12 − τ o.
Likewise, if Home does face retaliation, then the equilibrium world price is
ePwR ≡ ePw(τ o +∆, τ o) = 12 − τ o − ∆2 .
Now recall from (2.10) that Home’s welfare is given as W ( ePw) = ζH(1/2) ePw,
where ζH ∈ [1, 2] under A2. Thus, Home’s (gross) payoff under no retaliation and
retaliation is given as
WNR ≡ ζH(1/2) ePwNR = ζH(1/2)(12 − τ o). (5.1)
WR ≡ ζH(1/2) ePwR = ζH(1/2)(12 − τ o − ∆2 .). (5.2)
Using (5.1) and (5.2), we may thus define Home’s “valuation” of no retaliation as
WNR −WR = ζH
∆
4
. (5.3)
We now recall A4, which ensures that the reserve bid is small relative to the
value that a foreign country of the highest type places on winning versus losing.
We now show that A4 also has implications for Home’s willingness to bid:
Lemma 5.1: For any ζH ≥ 1,
WNR −WR > ω(2)− η(2) > ω(2)− λ(2) > bo.
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Proof: Using (5.3), we find that
WNR −WR = ζH
∆
4
≥ ∆
4
>
∆
4
− ∆
8
[4τ o + 3∆] (5.4)
= ω(2)− η(2) > ω(2)− λ(2) > bo,
where the first inequality uses A2 (ζH ≥ 1), the second inequality uses A3, the
subsequent equality uses (3.2), the next inequality uses (3.3), and the final in-
equality uses A4. Q.E.D.
As we will show, this lemma ensures that Home has the greatest incentive to win
the auction. Intuitively, Home receives all of the cost of a reduction in the world
price, while each foreign country enjoys only a share of the benefit.
A novel feature of our extended auction is that both positive and negative ex-
ternalities are present. As in the basic auction, a positive externality arises across
foreign countries: each foreign country prefers that the other foreign country win
to the possibility that neither foreign country wins (i.e., λ(ζ∗j) > η(ζ∗j)). In the
extended auction, however, Home is also a bidder, and a negative externality
arises between Home and the foreign countries: Home prefers that no country win
to the possibility that a foreign country wins, since retaliation is avoided only in
the former case (i.e., WNR > WR).
6. The Extended Auction: Equilibrium Bids and Revenue
We again look for symmetric equilibria, where symmetry in the extended auction
means that foreign countries adopt symmetric strategies. Home may adopt an
asymmetric strategy, and recall, too, that the extended auction may treat Home
differently than the foreign countries, in the event that Home ties with one or
both foreign countries. As above, we focus on pure-strategy equilibria. Let bH ∈
{N} ∪ [bo,∞) denote Home’s bid.
Our first step is to determine whether a symmetric equilibrium exists in which
Home always loses (i.e., a foreign country wins the right of retaliation with prob-
ability one). Our result is as follows:
Lemma 6.1: In any symmetric equilibrium of the extended auction, if bo is
sufficiently close to zero, then bH 6= N and Home cannot always lose.
Proof: To begin, we assume to the contrary that bH = N . The foreign firms then
bid as characterized above for the basic auction. Home’s payoff from bH = N is
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thus F 2(eζ∗)WNR + [1 − F 2(eζ∗)]WR. Notice that Home sometimes enjoys the no-
retaliation outcome, due to auction failure among the foreign countries. If Home
were to deviate and bid bo + ², for ² > 0 and small, then Home’s payoff would be
F 2(ζ∗)[WNR− bo]+ [1−F 2(ζ
∗
)]WR, approximately. Thus, using (5.3), Home does
better by deviating if and only if
[1− F
2(eζ∗)
F 2(ζ∗)
][ζH∆
4
] > bo.
Since ζ∗ > eζ∗ and ζH ∆
4
> bo (by (5.4)), this inequality is sure to hold when bo is
sufficiently close to zero.
Next, we suppose that bH 6= N and yet Home always loses. This is possible
only if bH ≥ bo and b(ζ∗j) ≥ bH for all ζ∗j ∈ [1, 2]. In that event, though, a foreign
firm with type close to 1 wins with positive probability and would do better by
deviating to N. The other foreign country would then win with probability one,
and so the deviating foreign country would enjoy the payoff λ(ζ∗j), which exceeds
the value of the weighted sum of ω(ζ∗j)− b(ζ∗j) and λ(ζ∗j) that it receives in the
putative equilibrium. For further details, see the proof of Lemma 4.2, where an
analogous argument is made. Q.E.D.
It is tempting to conjecture that this lemma holds for any bo. One might argue
that, if a foreign country is willing to bid, then surely Home would be willing to
bid more. After all, as Lemma 5.1 establishes, Home gets more from stopping
retaliation than any foreign country gains from having retaliation occur (whether
as a winner or a loser). This argument, however, is incomplete, as it ignores the
fact that Home may enjoy no retaliation even when not bidding. This happens
when the foreign countries get stuck in an auction failure. Thus, it is not obvious
that Home would always outbid the highest type of foreign country. We show in
the lemma, however, that Home will certainly do so if bo is sufficiently small.
Our second step is to consider whether symmetric equilibria exist in which
Home always wins (i.e., a foreign country wins the right to retaliate with proba-
bility zero). In fact, it is simple to construct equilibria of this kind.
Lemma 6.2: There exist symmetric equilibria of the extended auction in which
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Home always wins. One set of such equilibria is specified as follows:
bH ∈ [ω(2)− η(2), ζH
∆
4
] (6.1)
b(ζ∗j) = bH , for all ζ∗j ∈ [1, 2]
Home wins all ties.
Furthermore, in any equilibrium in which Home always wins, bH ∈ [ω(2) −
η(2), ζH ∆
4
].
Proof: We begin by establishing existence. Consider Home. A higher bid is
clearly not an attractive deviation. A lower bid is also an unattractive deviation.
Such a bid ensures certain retaliation, which implies a loss for Home since
WNR − bH ≥WNR − ζH
∆
4
=WR.
Consider next a foreign country. Of course, such a country is unable to gain from
a lower bid, since then it would only continue to lose. A higher bid would be most
attractive to a foreign country of type ζ∗j = 2. But if this type were to bid bH + ²,
for ² > 0 and small, then its payoff would be
ω(2)− (bH + ²) < ω(2)− bH ≤ ω(2)− [ω(2)− η(2)] = η(2),
and so the deviation is less attractive than bidding bH and losing to Home. Thus,
the strategies specified in (6.1) constitute a symmetric equilibrium for the ex-
tended auction.
Next, we establish that any such equilibriummust have bH ∈ [ω(2)−η(2), ζH ∆4 ].
Suppose Home always wins and bH < ω(2) − η(2). Then when a foreign country
has a type near 2, it would gain by deviating to bH + ², for ² positive and small,
as it thereby receives approximately ω(2)− bH > η(2). Suppose next that Home
always wins and bH > ζH ∆4 . Then WNR− bH < WNR− ζ
H ∆
4
=WR, and so Home
would gain by deviating and selecting N, as it then either enjoys WNR (in the
event of auction failure) or WR. Q.E.D.
A potential objection to the specification in Lemma 6.2 is that the foreign
countries use dominated strategies. In particular, for a foreign country of type ζ∗j,
any bid b such that b > max{ω(ζ∗j)− η(ζ∗j), bo} is dominated by the alternative
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strategy of selecting N.16 It follows that the specification used in (6.1) involves
the use of a dominated strategy by all types of foreign country other than the
type ζ∗j = 2.
This objection suggests that it is important to determine whether an equilib-
rium can be established without the use of dominated strategies. In the auction
game considered here, Home will resist cutting its bid from bH provided that
enough foreign types bid at or near bH . Intuitively, when bH < ζH ∆4 , a lower
bid generates a higher Home payoff when Home wins, but reduces Home’s payoff
when Home loses. Thus, if Home perceives a sufficient probability of losing when
it shades its bid, then Home will refrain from shading. For this to be true, it is
not necessary that the foreign country types all bid bH . It is necessary only that
the probability is sufficiently high that a foreign country bid will fall at or just
below bH .
As the following lemma establishes, however, it is not always possible to con-
struct a symmetric equilibrium in which Home always wins while insisting the
foreign countries do not use dominated strategies:
Lemma 6.3: In the extended auction, if the foreign countries do not use domi-
nated strategies and F
0
(2) < 3/16, then there does not exist a symmetric equilib-
rium in which Home always wins.
The proof is in the Appendix. Intuitively, it is impossible to stop Home from
cutting its bid from bH = ω(2)− η(2), if it is unlikely that a foreign country bids
at or just below bH . In turn, if there aren’t too many foreign country types that
are high (i.e., if F
0
(2) is small) and if foreign countries do not use dominated
strategies, then it is unlikely that a foreign country bids at or just below bH .
As Lemma 6.3 indicates, the requirement that dominated strategies not be
used can have important existence implications. If the density is low over the
region of highest foreign types, then this requirement can preclude the existence
of symmetric equilibria in which Home always wins.17 We show above that, when
bo is small, symmetric equilibria do not exist in which Home always loses, and
16To see this, note that the selection of N yields payoff η(ζ∗j) or λ(ζ∗j), depending upon
whether the other foreign country wins. By contrast, the bid of b yields payoff ω(ζ∗j) − b <
η(ζ∗j) < λ(ζ∗j) when b is the winning bid, yields the payoff λ(ζ∗j) when the other foreign
country wins, and yields the payoff η(ζ∗j) otherwise. Thus, the strategy of selecting N yields
a greater payoff than the strategy of selecting b whenever b would be the winning bid, and the
strategy of selecting N yields the same payoff as the strategy of selecting b whenever b would
not be the winning bid.
17Of course, under other distributional assumptions, symmetric equilibria may exist in which
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we establish just below that symmetric equilibria also fail to exist in which Home
sometimes wins (i.e., a foreign country wins the right to retaliate with probability
between zero and one). If a symmetric equilibrium exists when bo is small, then it
must involve Home always winning. Existence of a symmetric equilibrium is thus
not assured unless we allow that dominated strategies may be used.18
We now move to our third step and consider whether symmetric equilibria
exist in which Home sometimes wins. Our finding is as follows:
Lemma 6.4: In any symmetric equilibrium of the extended auction, if bo is suf-
ficiently close to zero, then Home cannot sometimes win.
The proof is in the Appendix. We sketch here the basic argument, which involves
three steps. First, we show that it is impossible to have a pooling region over
which foreign firms sometimes or always win, given that Home is allowed to bid in
the extended auction. Second, we show that Home sometimes wins only if there
exists bζ∗ ∈ (1, 2) such that b(bζ∗) = bH and, for all ζ∗j > bζ∗, b(ζ∗j) > bH and b
is strictly increasing. Third, we exploit the following tension. On the one hand,
type bζ∗ (perhaps plus ²) has the option of mimicking lower types, and so must be
indifferent between beating Home and not, indicating a relationship between ω(bζ∗)
and η(bζ∗). On the other hand, type bζ∗ has the option of mimicking higher types,
and so must be indifferent between bidding its equilibrium bid and that assigned
to a slightly higher type, indicating a relationship between ω(bζ∗) and λ(bζ∗). In
our basic auction, as Lemmas 4.4 and 4.9 indicate, this tension is resolved with a
pooling region at bo. But in the extended auction, as established in the first step,
we cannot have a pooling region over which foreign countries sometimes or always
win. A contradiction is thus suggested.
Home always wins and foreign countries do not use dominated strategies. For example, if the
distribution function is uniform and bo is small, then there exists a symmetric equilibrium in
which Home bids bH = ω(2)−η(2) and a foreign country of type ζ∗j bids b(ζ∗j) = ω(ζ∗j)−η(ζ∗j),
provided that the following parameter restriction is satsified: ζH−2+(4τo+3∆)/2 > 0. Details
are available from the authors.
18Related issues arise in other games. Consider, for example, a Bertrand pricing game, in
which firm 1’s constant unit cost is known to take value 1 while firm 2’s constant unit cost is
distributed over [1, 2]. In any Nash equilibrium for this Bertrand game, firm 1 sets its price
equal to 1 and wins all ties, while all types of firm 2 also select the price of 1 and lose the tie.
(It can be shown that this conclusion holds also when it is allowed that firm 1 can use mixed
strategies.) With the exception of the type for which cost equals 1, all types of firm 2 then use
a dominated strategy. This equilibrium is analogous to that described in (6.1) for the auction
game considered here.
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We may now use Lemmas 6.1, 6.2 and 6.4 to conclude as follows:
Proposition 6.1: In any symmetric equilibrium of the extended auction, if bo is
sufficiently close to zero, then Home always wins and bids bH ∈ [ω(2)−η(2), ζH ∆4 ].
Furthermore, the resulting expected revenue is strictly greater than in the equi-
librium outcome that occurs in the basic auction (as described in Propositions 4.1
and 4.2).
Proof: We need only confirm that expected revenue is higher in any symmetric
equilibrium of the extended auction than in the symmetric equilibrium outcome
of the basic auction. This is trivial to see. When Home is allowed to bid, Home
always wins and the seller thus always gets bH ≥ ω(2)− η(2). By contrast, in the
basic auction wherein Home does not bid, the seller sometimes (i.e., when there
is no auction failure) gets
b(ζ∗j) ≤ b(2) = ω(2)− λ(2)− ∆
4
ζ∗jZ
ζ
∗
F (x)dx < ω(2)− λ(2) < ω(2)− η(2).
Thus, expected revenue is clearly higher when Home bids. Q.E.D.
The expected-revenue result is of particular importance. Intuitively, when bo is
small so that Home is sure to bid, expected revenue rises relative to that achieved
in the basic auction, because (i) auction failure is avoided, and (ii) Home bids
more than would any foreign country were Home not allowed to bid.
7. Policy: Revenue and Efficiency Criteria
In this section we consider the normative implications of permitting Home to bid
to retire the right of retaliation. We do so by comparing the basic and extended
auctions under the alternative criteria of expected revenue and ex-ante efficiency.
7.1. Revenue
We first discuss the implications for expected revenue of permitting Home to
bid to retire the right of retaliation. Greater expected revenue would naturally
be viewed as a good thing from the point of view of the seller. Moreover, as
discussed in the Introduction, part of the motivation for considering such auctions
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in the WTO is to enhance the ability of smaller, poorer countries to achieve some
compensation in the event that a trading partner takes an action that nullifies or
impairs their benefits within the WTO. From this perspective as well, expected
revenue is a natural criterion for making normative comparisons across different
auction designs.
If the desirability of permitting Home to bid is evaluated on the basis of
expected revenue, Proposition 6.1 provides a clear normative conclusion: Home
should be permitted to bid to retire the right of retaliation against it. This follows
because, as Proposition 6.1 indicates, if bo is sufficiently small, Home always wins
and the seller thus always gets bH ≥ ω(2) − η(2). By contrast, in the basic
auction, the seller never receives a bid this high, and sometimes receives no bid
at all. Therefore, if bo is sufficiently small, the seller’s expected revenue is strictly
higher when Home is allowed to bid.
We observe as well that this normative conclusion is robust to a further ex-
tension of our auction games which allows for a “compensation” stage to precede
the auction. Such an extension can be motivated by actual WTO practice, which
typically encourages disputing parties to find a mutually agreeable form of com-
pensation as a final means to avoid a retaliatory outcome (see note 10). To see
that the conclusion holds in an extended game of this kind, let us suppose (i) that
Home makes a take-it-or-leave-it compensation offer to the harmed country (i.e.,
the seller in any subsequent auction) which the harmed country either accepts or
rejects, (ii) that a right of retaliation is granted to the harmed country (which it
may subsequently auction off) if and only if the offer of compensation is rejected,
and (iii) that both countries are risk neutral.
If the subsequent auction takes the form of our basic auction, then the seller’s
expected revenue from this auction is 2P (bo) (as defined in Lemma 4.10), and the
harmed country would therefore accept nothing less than 2P (bo) as compensation.
Home will offer to compensate the harmed country at the level 2P (bo) and foreclose
the subsequent auction if and only if Home’s payoff from doing so, WNR−2P (bo),
is greater than its expected payoff under the basic auction, which is given by
F 2(eζ∗)WNR + [1− F 2(eζ∗)]WR. We now report the following:
Lemma 7.1: For any ζH ≥ 1,
WNR − 2P (bo) > F 2(eζ∗)WNR + [1− F 2(eζ∗)]WR.
The proof of this lemma is found in the Appendix. Lemma 7.1 implies that Home
will indeed compensate the harmed country at the level 2P (bo) when the ensuing
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auction takes the form of our basic auction, thereby preventing the assignment
of a retaliation right and foreclosing the subsequent auction. Hence, if the basic
auction is preceded by a compensation stage as described above, the harmed
country can expect to receive an amount of revenue equal to 2P (bo).
If the subsequent auction instead takes the form of the extended auction
in which Home is permitted to bid, then with bo set sufficiently small Propo-
sition 6.1 indicates that Home always wins and the seller thus always gets bH ∈
[ω(2) − η(2), ζH ∆
4
] from this extended auction. Selecting an equilibrium of the
extended auction determines a particular bH in this range, and under this equi-
librium selection the harmed country would then accept nothing less than bH as
compensation. As Home therefore pays bH to avoid retaliation whether this pay-
ment takes the form of compensation or rather takes the form of the winning bid
in the ensuing auction, the harmed country will receive bH in any event when
the auction permits Home bids. Hence, if the extended auction (with bo small)
is preceded by a compensation stage as described above, the harmed country can
expect to receive an amount of revenue equal to bH ∈ [ω(2)− η(2), ζH ∆4 ].
It may now be seen that the addition of a prior compensation stage does not
change the basic normative conclusion of this subsection. Whether or not prior
compensation is a viable option which is available to Home, if the desirability
of permitting Home to bid is evaluated on the basis of expected revenue, Home
should be permitted to bid to retire the right of retaliation against it.19
7.2. Efficiency
We next discuss the implications for ex-ante efficiency of permitting Home to bid
to retire the right of retaliation. We define ex-ante efficiency according to the
objective functions of the affected governments. If the WTO seeks to best serve
the objectives of its member governments, then a normative case can be made
for choosing among auction designs according to the criterion of ex-ante efficiency
defined in this way.
In choosing between the basic and extended auctions, the affected governments
include the Home government, the two foreign governments, and the seller (the
19Note that, as we have modeled the prior compensation stage, Home would offer nothing to
the harmed country in the manner of prior compensation if no auction were permitted, since
by assumption the harmed country is itself unable to use the retaliation right against Home.
In this way, the mere ability to auction the right of retaliation, whether in the basic or the
extended auction setting, can help ensure that the harmed country receives compensation, even
if the auction itself is foreclosed by the payment of prior compensation.
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harmed government). In our quasi-linear setting, ex-ante efficiency is achieved
when the expected joint welfare among the four governments is maximized. We
thus adopt as our normative criterion in this subsection the expected joint welfare
of the affected governments.
A first observation is that, under this criterion, the expected revenue generated
by each auction is irrelevant. This is because the revenue paid by the winning
bidder to the seller is a pure transfer from one government to another, and such
transfers cannot alter the joint surplus available to the Home government, the
two foreign governments and the seller in our quasi-linear setting. Hence, when
ex-ante efficiency is the criterion, expected revenue differences cannot be used to
select among auction designs. Instead, differences in the allocation of the right
of retaliation across auctions becomes the critical feature. Moreover, since the
seller is only affected through the expected revenue, we may restrict our measure
of joint welfare to the sum of the (gross) welfare levels of the Home and the two
foreign governments.
In this regard, it might be thought that any retaliation would reduce efficiency.
This perspective suggests that it is desirable under the ex-ante efficiency criterion
to permit Home to bid. It must be remembered, however, that we have allowed
governments to be motivated by political-economy concerns, and so if a foreign
country experiences a sufficiently large political-economy shock it might be ef-
ficient to permit that country to raise its tariff level (i.e., retaliate to τ o + ∆).
Hence, to assess whether the basic auction — which results in retaliation unless
there is auction failure — can lead to greater ex-ante efficiency than the extended
auction — which never results in retaliation for sufficiently small bo — we need to
derive an expression for the expected joint welfare under each auction.
Consider first the extended auction. As just noted, for sufficiently small bo
Home always makes the winning bid and retires the retaliation right. Hence, let-
ting EJH denote the expected joint welfare under the extended auction, recalling
the definition of joint welfare J(τ ∗1, τ ∗2) for any two tariffs τ ∗1 and τ ∗2, and let-
ting EJ(τ o, τ o) denote the expected joint welfare when there is no retaliation (i.e.,
when τ ∗1 ≡ τ o and τ ∗2 ≡ τ o), we have that, for sufficiently small bo,
EJH = EJ(τ o, τ o).
We now develop an analogous expression for the basic auction. Using (3.2),
(3.3) and (5.3), we note that when foreign country 1 wins the right to retaliate,
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joint welfare is given by
J(τ o +∆, τ o) = J(τ o, τ o) + [ω(ζ∗1)− η(ζ∗1) + λ(ζ∗2)− η(ζ∗2) +WR −WNR]
= J(τ o, τ o) +
∆
8
[2(1− ζH −∆) + (ζ∗1 − ζ∗2)]. (7.1)
Similarly, when foreign country 2 wins, joint welfare is given by
J(τ o, τ o +∆) = J(τ o, τ o) +
∆
8
[2(1− ζH −∆) + (ζ∗2 − ζ∗1)]. (7.2)
Finally, (7.1) and (7.2) imply that
1
2
J(τ o +∆, τ o) +
1
2
J(τ o, τ o +∆) = J(τ o, τ o) +
∆
8
[2(1− ζH −∆)]. (7.3)
Let EJB denote the expected joint welfare under the basic auction. Using
(7.1), (7.2) and (7.3), and after some manipulation, we find that
EJB = EJ(τ o, τ o) +
∆
4
{[1− F 2(eζ∗)][1− ζH −∆]
+
ζ
∗Z
eζ∗
[
eζ∗Z
1
(ζ − ζ∗2)F 0(ζ∗2)dζ∗2]F 0(ζ))dζ +
2Z
ζ
∗
[
ζZ
1
(ζ − ζ∗2)F 0(ζ∗2)dζ∗2]F 0(ζ)dζ}.
Intuitively, the difference between the expected joint welfare under the basic auc-
tion (EJB) and the expected joint welfare when there is no retaliation (EJ(τ o, τ o))
is composed of the sum of three terms, which can be understood with the help
of (7.1)-(7.3). A first term ([1 − F 2(eζ∗)][1 − ζH − ∆]) represents the “baseline”
expected efficiency loss from protection with ζ∗1 ≡ ζ∗2. This term is strictly neg-
ative, and it appears in (7.1), (7.2) and (7.3), since some foreign country wins
the right to retaliate in each expression. The second and third terms are each
double integrals, and these terms represent the expected efficiency gain from al-
locating retaliation to the high-ζ∗i foreign country. These two terms are each
strictly positive. The first double integral measures this expected gain when the
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high-ζ∗i foreign country lies in the range [eζ∗, ζ∗] and the low-ζ∗i foreign country
lies in the range [1,eζ∗]. Excluded from this double integral is the range of low-
ζ∗i realizations that lie above eζ∗ but below the realization of the high-ζ∗i foreign
country. This is because there is pooling over this region in the basic auction,
with each foreign country receiving the right of retaliation with probability 1/2,
and as indicated by (7.3) this pooling region adds no expected efficiency gain from
allocating retaliation to the high-ζ∗i foreign country. The second double integral
measures this expected gain when the high-ζ∗i foreign country lies in the range
[ζ∗, 2]. There is no pooling in the basic auction when the high-ζ∗i foreign country
lies in this range, and so the range of low-ζ∗i realizations runs from 1 up to the
high-ζ∗i foreign country realization.
With expressions for the expected joint welfare under the basic and extended
auctions given by EJB and EJH, respectively, we may now state:
Proposition 7.1: If 1− ζH −∆ is sufficiently close to zero, then EJB > EJH.
Proof: Under A4, ζ∗ < 2. The proposition thus follows as a direct consequence
of the expressions for EJB and EJH provided above. Q.E.D.
Under our maintained assumptions, this proposition describes a parameter region
in which ζH ∈ [1, 2] is equal to or near unity, ∆ > 0 is near zero, and bo ≥ 0 is
equal to or near zero (so that A4 holds, even though ∆ is small). For example,
our maintained assumptions and the additional assumption in Proposition 7.1 all
hold if ζH = 1, bo = 0, and ∆ > 0 is sufficiently small.
According to Proposition 7.1, greater ex-ante efficiency is achieved under the
basic auction than under the extended auction (for small bo) if Home’s political-
economy weight is small (i.e. ζH is close to one) and the degree of retaliation being
auctioned is small (i.e., ∆ close to zero). Under these conditions, the expected
benefit of allocating the retaliation right to the foreign country that experiences
the biggest political-economy shock outweighs the expected cost imposed on the
other two countries, and so expected joint welfare is higher under the basic auction
than under the extended auction, where the right of retaliation is surely retired.
If the desirability of permitting Home to bid is evaluated on the basis of ex-
ante efficiency, Proposition 7.1 therefore provides a clear normative conclusion (at
least for bo small): Home should not be permitted to bid to retire the right of
retaliation against it unless the political costs of retaliation against Home (ζH)
and/or the size of the retaliation (∆) are sufficiently large. We observe that, for
the described parameter ranges, this normative conclusion is directly opposed to
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the conclusion reported in the previous subsection when the criterion is instead
expected revenue. More broadly, these findings indicate that the desirability of
key auction features will depend generally on what is perceived to be the purpose
of introducing auctions in the WTO-retaliation setting.
Finally, we note that the issue of whether prior compensation is a viable option
available to Home can have important normative implications for the ex-ante
efficiency of the basic auction. As Proposition 7.1 indicates, there are conditions
under which the allocation of retaliation rights under the basic auction improves
ex-ante efficiency relative to the certain retirement of the right to retaliate under
the extended auction. But as Lemma 7.1 indicates, when a compensation stage
precedes the basic auction, Home always makes a compensation offer which the
harmed country is certain to accept. Hence, by leading to certain retirement
of the right to retaliate, the presence of a viable prior compensation stage can
actually reduce ex-ante efficiency in the basic auction setting (to the level of ex-
ante efficiency achieved in the extended auction). More broadly, this suggests
that the compensation provisions of the WTO can have important links with
the performance of auctions of WTO retaliation rights, at least when ex-ante
efficiency is the concern, and that a more complete understanding of the impact
of permitting retaliation rights to be auctioned in the WTO may require a better
understanding of the workings of WTO compensation provisions.20
8. Conclusion
We offer a first formal analysis of the possibility that retaliation rights within
the WTO system might be allocated through auctions. We focus here on first-
price sealed-bid auctions. In our basic auction, two foreign countries bid for the
right to retaliate against the home country. The basic auction is characterized by
positive externalities, since retaliation by one foreign country improves the terms
20While our auction models predict that Home would always offer enough cash compensation
in a prior compensation stage to foreclose (the auction and thus) retaliation against it, in practice
governments rarely settle WTO disputes through the payment of cash compensation. A possible
interpretation is that in practice it is often efficient to have retaliation occur (i.e., the disputing
governments cannot settle on an amount of compensation that both would agree is better than
a retaliatory outcome). In this light, the effect of the positive externality across foreign bidders
in holding bids below their true valuation is what, in our auction models, ensures that Home
always finds it worthwhile to “outbid” the foreign bidders and retire the right of retaliation,
even when this is not efficient (i.e., even when it would be more valuable for one of the foreign
countries to exercise the retaliation right than for Home to retire it).
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of trade for the other foreign country. We show that this auction exhibits some
unusual properties: the retaliation right may be misallocated across the foreign
countries, and it is also possible that auction failure occurs. We then consider
an extended auction, in which the home country is also allowed to bid to retire
the right of retaliation. The extended auction is again characterized by positive
externalities between foreign countries. But the extended auction also features
negative externalities, since the home country experiences a negative externality
whenever a foreign country wins. In the extended auction, we find that auction
failure does not occur; in fact, the home country always wins and the retaliation
right is therefore always retired.
We also evaluate the different auction formats from normative standpoints.
The extended auction generates greater expected revenue for the seller than does
the basic auction. On the other hand, the basic auction may be preferred under
an efficiency criterion. As a general matter, our analysis thus suggests that the
desirability of key auction design features may hinge on the purpose that auctions
are expected to serve in the WTO-retaliation setting.
9. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4.1: To prove this lemma, fix a symmetric equilibrium. Sup-
pose that ζ∗jB > ζ
∗j
S and b(ζ
∗j
S ) 6= N. Let ρ(ζ∗j) denote the probability that foreign
country j wins when it bids b(ζ∗j). Let B ≡ prob{b(ζ∗j) 6= N}.
We first show part (i). Given b(ζ∗jS ) 6= N, incentive compatibility implies
ρ(ζ∗jS )[ω(ζ
∗j
S )− b(ζ
∗j
S )] + (1− ρ(ζ
∗j
S ))λ(ζ
∗j
S ) ≥ Bλ(ζ
∗j
S )+(1−B)η(ζ
∗j
S ), (9.1)
which is to say that type ζ∗jS must (weakly) prefer b(ζ
∗j
S ) to N . Now, suppose to
the contrary that b(ζ∗jB ) = N. Then type ζ
∗j
B must (weakly) prefer N to b(ζ
∗j
S ) :
Bλ(ζ∗jB )+(1−B)η(ζ
∗j
B ) ≥ ρ(ζ
∗j
S )[ω(ζ
∗j
B )− b(ζ
∗j
S )] + (1− ρ(ζ
∗j
S ))λ(ζ
∗j
B ). (9.2)
Adding (9.1) and (9.2) gives
B[λ(ζ∗jB )− λ(ζ
∗j
S )] +(1−B)[η(ζ
∗j
B )− η(ζ
∗j
S )] (9.3)
≥ ρ(ζ∗jS )[ω(ζ
∗j
B )− ω(ζ
∗j
S )] + (1− ρ(ζ
∗j
S ))[λ(ζ
∗j
B )− λ(ζ
∗j
S )].
Using (3.6), we may rewrite (9.3) as
B[1−∆]+(1−B) ≥ ρ(ζ∗jS )[1 +∆] + (1− ρ(ζ
∗j
S ))[1−∆],
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which in turn may be simplified as
1−B
2
≥ ρ(ζ∗jS ). (9.4)
Now, we also know that
ρ(ζ∗jS ) ≥ 1−B, (9.5)
since the probability of winning with b(ζ∗jS ) is at least the probability that the
rival foreign country does not bid (in which case a bid of b(ζ∗jS ) certainly wins).
Clearly, if B < 1, then (9.4) and (9.5) are contradictory.
Finally, if B = 1, so that the set of non-bidding types is of measure zero, then
(9.4) and (9.5) imply that type ζ∗jS must lose: ρ(ζ
∗j
S ) = 0.We thus may find a type
ζ∗jM ∈ (ζ
∗j
S ,ζ
∗j
B ) that bids and sometimes wins: ρ(ζ
∗j
M) > 0. Given that b(ζ
∗j
M) 6= N,
incentive compatibility implies that
ρ(ζ∗jM)[ω(ζ
∗j
M)− b(ζ
∗j
M)] + (1− ρ(ζ
∗j
M))λ(ζ
∗j
M) ≥ Bλ(ζ
∗j
M)+(1−B)η(ζ
∗j
M),
which is to say that type ζ∗jM must (weakly) prefer b(ζ
∗j
M) to N . But B = 1 and
(3.6) then imply that
ρ(ζ∗jM)[ω(ζ
∗j
B )− b(ζ
∗j
M)] > ρ(ζ
∗j
M)λ(ζ
∗j
B ),
and thus type ζ∗jB strictly prefers b(ζ
∗j
M) to N, which is again a contradiction.
We now prove part (ii). Given that ζ∗jB > ζ
∗j
S and b(ζ
∗j
S ) 6= N, we have from
part (i) that b(ζ∗jB ) 6= N. Incentive compatibility thus implies
ρ(ζ∗jB )[ω(ζ
∗j
B )− b(ζ
∗j
B )] + (1− ρ(ζ
∗j
B ))λ(ζ
∗j
B ) (9.6)
≥ ρ(ζ∗jS )[ω(ζ
∗j
B )− b(ζ
∗j
S )] + (1− ρ(ζ
∗j
S ))λ(ζ
∗j
B )
and
ρ(ζ∗jS )[ω(ζ
∗j
S )− b(ζ
∗j
S )] + (1− ρ(ζ
∗j
S ))λ(ζ
∗j
S ) (9.7)
≥ ρ(ζ∗jB )[ω(ζ
∗j
S )− b(ζ
∗j
B )] + (1− ρ(ζ
∗j
B ))λ(ζ
∗j
S ).
Adding (9.6) and (9.7), we obtain
[ρ(ζ∗jB )− ρ(ζ
∗j
S )][ω(ζ
∗j
B )− λ(ζ
∗j
B )] ≥ [ρ(ζ
∗j
B )− ρ(ζ
∗j
S )][ω(ζ
∗j
S )− λ(ζ
∗j
S )]. (9.8)
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Since ω − λ is strictly increasing, it follows from (9.8) that ρ(ζ∗jB ) ≥ ρ(ζ
∗j
S ) and
thus, equivalently, that b(ζ∗jB ) ≥ b(ζ
∗j
S ). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4.4:We establish the lemma by proving a sequence of claims:
Claim 1: In any symmetric equilibrium, if 2 ≥ ζ∗jB > ζ
∗j
S ≥ 1 and b(ζ∗j) ≡ eb ≥ bo
for all ζ∗j ∈ [ζ∗jS , ζ
∗j
B ], then eb = bo.
To prove this claim, we suppose to the contrary that b(ζ∗j) ≡ eb > bo for ζ∗j ∈
[ζ∗jS , ζ
∗j
B ], where 2 ≥ ζ
∗j
B > ζ
∗j
S ≥ 1. There are two subcases.
First, suppose that ω(2)−eb ≤ λ(2). It then follows that ω(ζ∗jS )−eb < λ(ζ∗jS ).
Hence, type ζ∗jS as well as an interval of types just above ζ
∗j
S would strictly gain
from deviating toeb−² ≥ bo, for ² positive and small. With positive probability, the
other country bidseb, and such a deviation then converts ties into losses, resulting in
a strict gain. If the other country bids more thaneb, then the deviation is irrelevant.
Finally, if the other country bids less than eb, then the deviation converts wins into
losses (when the other country’s bid falls between the deviant bid and eb) or results
in a win with a lower bid (when the other country’s bid falls below the deviant
bid). In either case, the deviation results in a strict gain.
Second, suppose that ω(2)−eb > λ(2). Then there exists some value ζ∗jz ∈ (1, 2)
such that ω(ζ∗jz ) − eb = λ(ζ∗jz ). Of course, not every type in [ζ∗jS , ζ∗jB ] can be ζ∗jz ;
thus, there exists a sub-interval of types, (ζ∗j
z
, ζ∗jz ) ⊂ [ζ
∗j
S , ζ
∗j
B ] over which (i)
ω(ζ∗j) − eb > λ(ζ∗j) or (ii) ω(ζ∗j) − eb < λ(ζ∗j). Consider case (i). Any type
ζ∗j ∈ (ζ∗j
z
, ζ∗jz ) would then strictly gain by deviating to eb + ², converting ties
to wins. Likewise, in case (ii), such types would strictly gain by deviating toeb− ² ≥ bo, converting ties to losses. This proves Claim 1.
Claim 2: In any symmetric equilibrium, there exists ² ∈ (0, 2 − ζ∗L] such that
b(ζ∗j) = bo for all ζ∗j ∈ (ζ∗L, ζ∗L + ²].
To prove this claim, we suppose to the contrary that b is strictly increasing at ζ∗L.
By Lemma 4.3, we know that b(ζ∗j) 6= N for all ζ∗j ∈ (ζ∗L, 2]. Further, Lemma 4.1
indicates that b cannot decrease; thus, b(ζ∗j) > bo for all ζ∗j ∈ (ζ∗L, 2]. By Claim
1, it thus follows that pooling does not occur anywhere over ζ∗j ∈ (ζ∗L, 2]. Hence,
b is strictly increasing over ζ∗j ∈ (ζ∗L, 2].
For simplicity, let us assume that type ζ∗L bids. Given that b is strictly increas-
ing throughout the bidding region, type ζ∗L wins only when the other country does
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not bid. It follows that b(ζ∗L) = bo is necessary. It is also necessary that type ζ∗L
is indifferent between bidding and not bidding; thus, it must be that
Bλ(ζ∗L) + (1−B)[ω(ζ∗L)− bo] = Bλ(ζ∗L) + (1−B)η(ζ∗L),
or equivalently
ω(ζ∗L)− bo = η(ζ∗L), (9.9)
since B < 1 follows from Lemma 4.2.
Finally, it is also necessary that types higher than ζ∗L are unable to gain through
deviations. But (9.9) implies that
ω(ζ∗L)− bo < λ(ζ∗L). (9.10)
Given that payoffs are continuous, it follows from (9.10) that ω(ζ∗L + ²) − bo <
λ(ζ∗L + ²), for ² positive and small. As b(ζ∗L + ²) > bo, it follows that
ω(ζ∗L + ²)− b(ζ∗L + ²) < λ(ζ∗L + ²).
Thus, type ζ∗L + ² prefers losing to winning. As a consequence, it would strictly
gain by deviating and bidding less.21
We have now constructed an interval of types that would deviate and bid less.
This is a contradiction, and so our supposition that b is strictly increasing at ζ∗L
must be false. Hence, a region of pooling must begin at ζ∗L. By Claim 1, we know
that pooling must occur at the reserve bid, bo. This establishes Claim 2.
Claim 3: In any symmetric equilibrium, b(2) > bo.
Suppose to the contrary that b(2) = bo. By Claim 2, pooling occurs at bo for all
types ζ∗j ∈ (ζ∗L, 2]. Consider type ζ∗j = 2. This type receives payoff [B2 + 1 −
B](ω(2) − bo) + B2 λ(2), where B = 1 − F (ζ
∗
L) ∈ (0, 1). If type ζ∗j = 2 were to
deviate and bid bo+², for ² positive and small, it would receive payoff ω(2)−bo−².
The gain from this deviation is
B
2
[ω(2)− bo − λ(2)]− ² > 0,
21In the event that the rival bids more than b(ζ∗L + ²), type ζ∗L + ² loses and enjoys payoff
λ(ζ∗L+ ²) whether or not it deviates; in the event that the rival doesn’t bid or bids less than the
deviant bid, type ζ∗L + ² gains from deviating since it wins with a lower bid; and in the event
that the rival bid falls between b(ζ∗L + ²) and the deviant bid, type ζ∗L + ² gains from deviating
since it prefers losing to winning with the bid b(ζ∗L + ²).
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where the inequality follows for ² small, given A4 and B ∈ (0, 1). To prevent
deviations by higher types, therefore, it is necessary that pooling does not extend
throughout the support. This proves Claim 3.
Together, the three claims establish that a region of pooling must begin at
ζ∗L. The pooling occurs at the reserve bid, bo, and it does not include the highest
types. Given that b is (weakly) increasing by Lemma 4.1, it follows that b exceeds
bo for higher types. The necessary existence of ζ∗H ∈ (ζ∗L, 2) is thus established,
and the lemma is proved. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4.5: To prove this lemma, we recall from Lemma 4.4 that
b(ζ∗j) > bo for ζ∗j > ζ∗H , where ζ∗H ∈ (ζ∗L, 2). By Lemma 4.1 and Claim 1, b is
strictly increasing for ζ∗j > ζ∗H . Suppose b(ζ∗H) > bo. Then type ζ∗H would strictly
gain by deviating to b
0 ∈ (bo, b(ζ∗H)), since it preserves its win-loss probabilities
but now wins with a lower bid. Thus, it is necessary that b(ζ∗H) = bo. Finally,
suppose there is a discontinuity at some value ζ∗d ∈ [ζ∗H , 2]. For simplicity, suppose
that b contains its upward jump, so that lim
²→0
b(ζ∗d+ ²) = b(ζ∗d). Then type ζ∗d would
strictly gain from a deviation to a lower bid that rests in the gap, as it would
thereby preserve its win-loss probabilities while winning with a lower bid. Thus,
b(ζ∗j) is continuous for ζ∗j ≥ ζ∗H . Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4.6: Using (3.5), it is straightforward to show that (4.1) holds
if and only if ζ∗(bo) takes the form given in (4.2). Clearly, ζ
∗
(bo) > 1. It remains
to show that ζ∗(bo) < 2. Using A4 and (3.5), observe that
2− ζ∗(bo) = 1− (4τ o + 2∆+
4
∆
bo) > 1− [4τ o + 2∆+
4
∆
(ω(2)− λ(2))] = 0,
which establishes the lemma. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4.7: Referring to (4.3), observe that LHS(ζ∗j = ζ∗) = 0 <
RHS(ζ∗j = ζ∗), where the inequality follows since F (ζ∗) > 0 by Lemma 4.6 and
ω(ζ∗)− bo − η(ζ
∗
) > ω(ζ∗)− bo − λ(ζ
∗
) = 0. Next, observe that LHS(ζ∗j = 1) >
0 = RHS(ζ∗j = 1), where the inequality follows since F (ζ∗)− F (1) = F (ζ∗) > 0
by Lemma 4.6 and λ(1)− (ω(1)− bo) > 0. Given the continuity of the functions
in (4.3), it now follows that a solution eζ∗(bo) exists with eζ∗(bo) ∈ (1, ζ∗(bo)).
To show that this solution is unique, we show that LHS(ζ∗j) − RHS(ζ∗j) is
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strictly decreasing. Using (3.6), we find that
d[LHS(ζ∗j)−RHS(ζ∗j)]
dζ∗j
=
F (ζ∗)[λ
0
(ζ∗j)− ω0(ζ∗j)
2
]− F 0(ζ∗j)[ω(ζ
∗j)− bo + λ(ζ∗j)− 2η(ζ∗j)
2
] < 0,
where the inequality follows since F (ζ∗) > 0 by Lemma 4.6, λ0(ζ∗j) < ω0(ζ∗j),
F
0
(ζ∗j) > 0 and
ω(ζ∗j)− bo + λ(ζ∗j)− 2η(ζ∗j) > 0.
To see that the latter inequality holds, observe that the expression is constant in
ζ∗j, since ω0(ζ∗j) + λ0(ζ∗j)− 2η0(ζ∗j) = 0. It is sufficient, therefore, to show that
the inequality holds at ζ∗j = 2. To see this, we observe that
ω(2)− bo + λ(2)− 2η(2) > ω(2)− bo − λ(2) > 0,
where the former inequality uses λ(2) > η(2) and the latter inequality uses A4.
Finally, we establish that eζ∗(bo) is strictly increasing. To this end, we use (4.3)
and compute that
deζ∗
dbo
= −1
2
[F (ζ∗) + F (eζ∗)] + F 0(ζ∗)[λ(eζ∗)− (ω(eζ∗)− bo)]dζ∗dbo
d[LHS(ζ∗j)−RHS(ζ∗j)]
dζ∗j
, (9.11)
where the denominator is evaluated at ζ∗j = eζ∗. Our work just above establishes
that the denominator is negative. To see that the numerator is positive, observe
that F (ζ∗)+F (eζ∗) > 0 (since ζ∗ > eζ∗ > 1), F 0(ζ∗) > 0, ∂ζ∗∂bo = 4∆ > 0 (using (4.2)),
and λ(eζ∗)− (ω(eζ∗)− bo) > λ(ζ∗)− (ω(ζ∗)− bo) = 0 (since ζ∗ > eζ∗). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4.8: Fix a symmetric equilibrium. Consider type ζ∗H . This type
could choose bid bo and thus tie with the bids of an interval of the rival country’s
types. Alternatively, with an arbitrarily small increase in its bid, if could select
bid bo + ², thereby receiving essentially the same payoff when the rival country
bids above bo or elects not to bid. With the latter choice, however, type ζ∗H wins
rather than ties when the rival country bids bo. Given the continuity of the payoff
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functions, since types just below (above) ζ∗H choose to bid bo (just above bo), type
ζ∗H must be indifferent between the alternatives. Thus, it is necessary that the
payoff to type ζ∗H from bidding bo,
F (ζ∗L)(ω(ζ∗H)− bo) +
F (ζ∗H)− F (ζ∗L)
2
(ω(ζ∗H)− bo + λ(ζ∗H)) + (1− F (ζ∗H))λ(ζ∗H),
must be the same as the payoff to type ζ∗H from bidding bo plus an arbitrarily
small increment,
F (ζ∗L)(ω(ζ∗H)− bo) + (F (ζ∗H)− F (ζ∗L))(ω(ζ∗H)− bo) + (1− F (ζ∗H))λ(ζ∗H).
Indifference is thus obtained if and only if [ω(ζ∗H)− bo + λ(ζ∗H)]/2 = ω(ζ∗H)− bo,
or equivalently ω(ζ∗H)− λ(ζ∗H) = bo. By (4.1), ζ∗H = ζ
∗
(bo) is necessary.
Consider next type ζ∗L. This type must be indifferent between not bidding and
selecting the bid bo. Thus, it is necessary that the payoff to type ζ∗L of not bidding,
F (ζ∗L)η(ζ∗L) + (1− F (ζ∗L))λ(ζ∗L),
must equal the payoff to type ζ∗L from bidding bo,
F (ζ∗L)(ω(ζ∗L)− bo) +
F (ζ∗H)− F (ζ∗L)
2
(ω(ζ∗L)− bo + λ(ζ∗L)) + (1− F (ζ∗H))λ(ζ∗L).
Equating this expressions and simplifying, we obtain
(F (ζ∗H)− F (ζ∗L))[
λ(ζ∗L)− (ω(ζ∗L)− bo)
2
] = F (ζ∗L)[ω(ζ∗L)− bo − η(ζ∗L)].
Next, we recall from above that ζ∗H = ζ
∗
(bo) is necessary. Referring to (4.3), we
thus see that ζ∗L = eζ∗(bo) is necessary. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4.9: To establish this lemma, we use (4.4) and (4.6) and
rewrite the local incentive constraint as follows:
F
0
(ζ∗j)[ω(ζ∗j)− λ(ζ∗j)] = d[F (ζ
∗j)b(ζ∗j)]
dζ∗j
. (9.12)
45
We follow standard arguments (see, e.g., Riley and Samuelson (1981)). To begin,
we integrate both sides and rearrange terms, obtaining that the expected payment
of type ζ∗j ∈ [ζ∗H , 2] must be
F (ζ∗j)b(ζ∗j) = F (ζ∗)b(ζ∗) +
ζ∗jZ
ζ
∗
F
0
(x)[ω(x)− λ(x)]dx. (9.13)
But we also know from Lemmas 4.5 and 4.8 that b(ζ∗) = bo is also necessary.
Thus, using (9.13), we conclude that, in any symmetric equilibrium, the expected
payment of type ζ∗j ∈ [ζ∗H , 2] must be
F (ζ∗j)b(ζ∗j) = F (ζ∗)bo +
ζ∗jZ
ζ
∗
F
0
(x)[ω(x)− λ(x)]dx. (9.14)
We next integrate by parts and use (4.1), finding that
ζ∗jZ
ζ
∗
F
0
(x)[ω(x)− λ(x)]dx (9.15)
= F (ζ∗j)[ω(ζ∗j)− λ(ζ∗j)]− F (ζ∗)b0 −
∆
4
ζ∗jZ
ζ
∗
F (x)dx.
Substituting (9.15) into (9.14), we obtain that, in any symmetric equilibrium, the
expected payment of type ζ∗j ∈ [ζ∗H , 2] must be
F (ζ∗j)b(ζ∗j) = F (ζ∗j)[ω(ζ∗j)− λ(ζ∗j)]− ∆
4
ζ∗jZ
ζ
∗
F (x)dx. (9.16)
Solving (9.16) for b(ζ∗j) then completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.2: Consider the bidding function defined in Proposition
4.1. Without loss of generality, suppose that b(eζ∗) = bo. We show that no type
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can gain from a deviation. Consider any type ζ∗j. If this type were to select N,
then it would receive payoff F (eζ∗)η(ζ∗j) + (1−F (eζ∗))λ(ζ∗j). If instead it were to
select bo, then it would receive payoff
F (eζ∗)(ω(ζ∗j)− bo) + F (ζ∗)− F (eζ∗)
2
(ω(ζ∗j)− bo + λ(ζ∗j)) + (1− F (ζ
∗
))λ(ζ∗j).
Let Gn(ζ∗j) represent the the gain to type ζ∗j from choosing N rather than bo.
Using (4.3), note that Gn(eζ∗) = 0. Calculations give
G
0
n(ζ∗j) = (F (ζ
∗
)− F (eζ∗))λ0(ζ∗j)− ω0(ζ∗j)
2
− F (eζ∗)(ω0(ζ∗j)− η0(ζ∗j)) < 0.
(9.17)
Thus, if ζ∗j ∈ [1,eζ∗), then type ζ∗j indeed prefersN to bo. Similarly, if ζ∗j ∈ (eζ∗, 2],
then it prefers bo to N.
Next, consider any ζ∗jS and ζ
∗j
B drawn from the interval [ζ
∗
, 2] with ζ∗jS < ζ
∗j
B .
Referring to (4.4), (4.6) and (4.5), we may confirm that type ζ∗jB loses by deviating
and selecting type ζ∗j0S s bid: U(ζ
∗j
B , ζ
∗j
B )− U(ζ
∗j
S , ζ
∗j
B )
=
ζ∗jBZ
ζ∗jS
U1(x, ζ∗jB )dx =
ζ∗jBZ
ζ∗jS
U1(x, ζ∗jB )− U1(x, x)dx =
ζ∗jBZ
ζ∗jS
ζ∗jBZ
x
U12(x, y)dydx > 0.
Likewise, we may verify that type ζ∗jS loses by deviating and selecting type ζ
∗j0
B s
bid. In short, over the region for which the bid function is strictly increasing,
the single-crossing property holds, and so the necessary local incentive constraint
implies as well that the global incentive constraint (over the region) holds.
With these relationships in place, we show that no type can gain from a devi-
ation. First, fix ζ∗j ∈ [1,eζ∗). As established above, any such type prefers N to bo,
and it would thus lose by mimicking the bid of any type in the interval [eζ∗, ζ∗].
It remains to show that ζ∗j would lose by mimicking the bid of any type in the
interval [ζ∗, 2]. Let bζ∗j ∈ [ζ∗, 2]. Using (4.4), (4.6) and (4.5), observe that
U1(bζ∗j, ζ∗j) = U1(bζ∗j, ζ∗j)− U1(bζ∗j,bζ∗j) = −
bζ∗jZ
ζ∗j
U12(bζ∗j, x)dx < 0,
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and so type ζ∗j is most tempted to mimic the bid of type ζ∗. But this type bids
bo, and we know type ζ∗j prefers N to bo.
Second, fix ζ∗j ∈ [eζ∗, ζ∗]. As established above, ζ∗j ∈ (eζ∗, ζ∗] prefers bo to
N, while type eζ∗ is indifferent. Thus, a type ζ∗j ∈ [eζ∗, ζ∗] does not gain from
mimicking a type in the interval [1,eζ∗). It remains to show that ζ∗j would not
gain by mimicking the bid of any type in the interval [ζ∗, 2]. Arguing as in the
previous paragraph, it is straightforward to see that ζ∗j is most tempted to mimic
ζ∗. But this type bids bo, just as does ζ∗j, and so ζ∗j does not gain from mimicking
the bid of any type in [ζ∗, 2].
Third, fix ζ∗j ∈ [ζ∗, 2]. As established above, a global incentive constraint is
satisfied over this region, and so ζ∗j loses by mimicking the bid of any other type
in [ζ∗, 2]. In particular, ζ∗j > ζ∗ loses by deviating to b(ζ∗) = bo. It remains to
show that ζ∗j ∈ [ζ∗, 2] would not gain by mimicking a type in the interval [1,eζ∗)
and selecting N. By (9.17), type ζ∗j ∈ [ζ∗, 2] prefers bo to N. Since ζ∗j > ζ
∗
prefers
its own bid to bo, every type ζ∗j ∈ [ζ
∗
, 2] loses by selecting N .
Finally, our proof relies on the function U, which presumes that b is strictly
increasing for ζ∗j > ζ∗. To confirm this property, we differentiate the bid function
specified in Proposition 4.1 and find that b
0
(ζ∗j) > 0 (b0(ζ∗j) = 0) for ζ∗j > ζ∗
(ζ∗j = ζ∗). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4.10: To begin, we compute the ex ante expected payment by
an individual foreign country, P (bo). Using (9.16), this is given as
P (bo) = (9.18)
ζ
∗Z
eζ∗
bo[
F (ζ∗)− F (eζ∗)
2
+ F (eζ∗)]dF (ζ∗j) + 2Z
ζ
∗
F (ζ∗j)b(ζ∗j)dF (ζ∗j) =
bo
[F (ζ∗) + F (eζ∗)][F (ζ∗)− F (eζ∗)]
2
+
2Z
ζ
∗
{F (ζ∗j)[ω(ζ∗j)− λ(ζ∗j)]− ∆
4
ζ∗jZ
ζ
∗
F (x)dx}dF (ζ∗j).
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Integrating by parts, we find that
2Z
ζ
∗
ζ∗jZ
ζ
∗
F (x)dxdF (ζ∗j) =
2Z
ζ
∗
F (x)(1− F (x))dx. (9.19)
Using (9.19) and simplifying, we may rewrite (9.18) as
P (bo) = bo
[F 2(ζ∗)− F 2(eζ∗)]
2
(9.20)
+
2Z
ζ
∗
F (ζ∗j){[ω(ζ∗j)− λ(ζ∗j)]F 0(ζ∗j)− ∆
4
(1− F (ζ∗j))}dζ∗j.
Given (9.20), since the bidders use symmetric bidding strategies, the lemma is
now proved. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.3: Recalling that ζ∗ and eζ∗ depend upon bo, we use
(4.1) and (4.2) to derive that
d2P (bo)
dbo
| bo=0 = {F 2(ζ∗)− F 2(eζ∗) + 2F (ζ∗)(1− F (ζ∗)} |bo=0
> {F 2(ζ∗)− F 2(ζ∗) + 2F (ζ∗)(1− F (ζ∗)} |bo=0
= 2{F (ζ∗)(1− F (ζ∗)} |bo=0> 0,
where the first inequality uses ζ∗ > eζ∗ and the second inequality uses ζ∗ ∈ (1, 2)
at bo = 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6.3: We consider here whether an equilibrium can be con-
structed in which Home always wins and foreign countries do not use dominated
strategies. To this end, we begin with the following specification:
bH = ω(2)− η(2) (9.21)
b(ζ∗j) = max{ω(ζ∗j)− η(ζ∗j), bo}, for all ζ∗j ∈ [1, 2].
We consider whether Home would gain from deviating to a lower bid, bH − ².
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For ² positive and small, we may define the critical type ζ∗² at which the deviant
Home bid equals the foreign bid by22
ω(ζ∗j)− η(ζ∗j) = bH − ². (9.22)
Using (9.22), we now observe that
∂ζ∗²
∂² = −
1
ω0(ζ∗²)− η
0(ζ∗²)
= − 8
∆
. (9.23)
Thus, the payoff to Home from the deviation is
Ψ(²) ≡ F 2(ζ∗²)[WNR − (bH − ²)] + [1− F 2(ζ∗²)]WR. (9.24)
Home will thus deviate if Ψ(²) > Ψ(0) for some small ².
To explore this possibility, we use (9.24) to compute
Ψ
0
(²) = 2F (ζ∗²)F
0
(ζ∗²)
∂ζ∗²
∂² [WNR − (bH − ²)−WR] + F
2(ζ∗²). (9.25)
Using (9.23) and (9.21), we may rewrite (9.25) as
Ψ
0
(²) = −2F (ζ∗²)F
0
(ζ∗²)
8
∆
[WNR −WR − (ω(2)− η(2)) + ²] + F 2(ζ∗²). (9.26)
Now, when ² = 0, we have that ζ∗² = 2, and we may derive from (9.26) that
Ψ
0
(0) = −4F 0(2)[ζH − 1 + 1
2
[4τ o + 3∆])] + 1 (9.27)
> −4F 0(2)[ζH − 2
3
] + 1 ≥ −F 0(2)[16
3
] + 1,
where the first inequality uses A3 and the second inequality uses A2 (ζH ≤ 2).
Using (9.27), it thus follows that, when F
0
(2) < 3/16, the specification in (9.21)
cannot constitute a symmetric equilibrium, since Home would enjoy a strict gain
(Ψ
0
(0) > 0) if it were to slightly reduce its bid from bH .
Building on this derivation, we now establish the lemma. Suppose to the
contrary that a symmetric equilibrium exists in which Home always wins and
22Under A4, we know that ω(2)− λ(2) > bo, from which it follows that ω(2)− η(2) > bo. For
² small, it thus follows that b(ζ∗² ) > bo. If we assume further that ω(1) − η(1) > bo, then the
definition of ζ∗² is appropriate even for larger values of ².
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foreign countries do not use dominated strategies, when F
0
(2) < 3/16. From
Lemma 6.2, we know that bH ∈ [ω(2) − η(2), ζH ∆4 ]. Furthermore, as argued in
the text, for a foreign country of type ζ∗j, any bid b such that b > max{ω(ζ∗j)−
η(ζ∗j), bo} is dominated by the alternative strategy of selecting N. By A3, ω(2)−
η(2) > ω(2)−λ(2) > bo. Thus, if foreign countries do not use dominated strategies,
then b(ζ∗j) ≤ ω(2)−η(2). It follows that Home would never bid bH > ω(2)−η(2),
since Home could continue winning with a slightly lower bid. We thus conclude
that, if a symmetric equilibrium exists in which Home wins and foreign countries
do not use dominated strategies, then Home must bid bH = ω(2)− η(2) and the
foreign country bids must satisfy b ≤ max{ω(ζ∗j) − η(ζ∗j), bo}. Now, if Home
bids bH = ω(2) − η(2), then Home is least tempted to deviate with a slightly
lower bid, if foreign bids are as high as possible while respecting the requirement
that dominated strategies not be used. For the higher foreign types, this means
that b(ζ∗j) = max{ω(ζ∗j) − η(ζ∗j), bo}. But this is the specification given above
in (9.21), and we establish in (9.27) that Home would then deviate to a slightly
lower bid if F
0
(2) < 3/16. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6.4: With bo sufficiently close to zero, we know from Lemma 6.1
that Home does not select bH = N. Thus, it is not possible that Home sometimes
wins, by not bidding and escaping retaliation sometimes when auction failures
occur. At the other extreme, if bH ≥ ω(2) − η(2), then Home must always win.
Therefore, if Home wins sometimes, then it must be that bH ∈ [bo,ω(2) − η(2)).
Hence, we assume that a symmetric equilibrium exists in which Home sometimes
wins with bH ∈ [bo,ω(2)− η(2)). We seek a contradiction.
Suppose that the foreign countries have a pooling region on which they always
or sometimes win. Formally, suppose that there exists [ζ∗j1 , ζ
∗j
2 ] such that ζ
∗j
1 < ζ
∗j
2
and b(ζ∗j) = b ≥ bH for all ζ∗j ∈ [ζ∗j1 , ζ
∗j
2 ], where Home does not always win a tie
(when b = bH). If b = bH , then Home could raise its bid by ² and gain, since by
(5.4) we know that WNR −WR > ω(2)− λ(2) > bH . If b > bH , then b > bo. As in
the proof of Claim 1 in Lemma 4.4, either type ζ∗j1 will gain from a lower bid or
type ζ∗j2 will gain from a higher bid. (The arguments are unaffected by bH , since
bH is lower in this case than the relevant bids.) Thus, it is impossible that the
foreign countries have a pooling region on which they always or sometimes win.
In sum, if foreign countries use a pooling region, then on that region they must
always lose: either b < bH , or b = bH and Home always wins the tie.23
Given our assumption that Home sometimes wins, it is necessary that there
23This is consistent with the equilibrium in Lemma 6.2, in which Home always wins.
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exists a positive measure of foreign types that win against Home. As just es-
tablished, these types cannot pool anywhere, and so there must exist a positive
measure of foreign types whose bids exceed bH . Let ζ∗jB and ζ
∗j
S be two such types,
with ζ∗jB > ζ
∗j
S . Arguing as in Lemma 4.1, with the definition of B modified so that
B ≡ prob{b(ζ∗j) > bH}, we may derive that all types in the interval [ζ∗jS , ζ∗jB ] bid
above bH and further that b(ζ∗jB ) ≥ b(ζ
∗j
S ). Since pooling regions are not possible
for bids that exceed bH , we know that b(ζ∗jB ) > b(ζ
∗j
S ). It follows that there must
exist bζ∗ ∈ (1, 2) such that, for all ζ∗j > bζ∗, b(ζ∗j) > bH and b is strictly increasing.
Furthermore, if we let bζ∗ denote the lowest such value, then we know as well that
b(bζ∗) = bH . Otherwise, there would be a gap between b(bζ∗) and bH , and in analogy
with Lemma 4.5 this would give types near bζ∗ a strict benefit from deviating to a
lower bid that rests in that gap.
Therefore, we consider now the possibility that Home sometimes wins and
there exists bζ∗ ∈ (1, 2) such that b(bζ∗) = bH and, for all ζ∗j > bζ∗, b(ζ∗j) > bH and b
is strictly increasing. We propose to exploit the following tension. Looking toward
lower types, type bζ∗ (perhaps plus ²) must be indifferent between beating Home
and not, indicating a relationship between ω(bζ∗) and η(bζ∗). Looking toward higher
types, type bζ∗ (perhaps plus ²)must be indifferent between bidding its equilibrium
bid and that assigned to a slightly higher type, indicating a relationship between
ω(bζ∗) and λ(bζ∗). In our basic auction, as Lemmas 4.4 and 4.9 indicate, this
tension is resolved with a pooling region at bo. But in the extended auction,
as just discussed, we cannot have a pooling region over which foreign countries
sometimes or always win. This suggests that a contradiction is inevitable.
To confirm this suggestion, we proceed as follows. We note first that typebζ∗ (perhaps plus ²) must be indifferent between beating Home with a bid at (or
just above) bH and losing to Home: F (bζ∗)[ω(bζ∗) − b(bζ∗)] + [1 − F (bζ∗)]λ(bζ∗) =
F (bζ∗)η(bζ∗) + [1− F (bζ∗)]λ(bζ∗). We thus conclude that
ω(bζ∗)− b(bζ∗) = η(bζ∗). (9.28)
This is the relationship between ω(bζ∗) and η(bζ∗).
We note second that any type at or above bζ∗ must satisfy a local incentive
compatibility condition, ensuring that no gain is possible by mimicking the be-
havior of a slightly higher type. Using (4.4) and (4.6), we may again derive (9.12),
which now must hold for all ζ∗j ∈ [bζ∗, 2]. Taking (9.12) and integrating over the
range [bζ∗, ζ∗j], we derive an expression analogous to (9.13). In particular, we find
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that the expected payment of type ζ∗j ≥ bζ∗ is
F (ζ∗j)b(ζ∗j) = F (bζ∗)b(bζ∗) + ζ∗jZ
bζ∗
F
0
(x)[ω(x)− λ(x)]dx. (9.29)
Integrating by parts, we see that
ζ∗jZ
bζ∗
F
0
(x)[ω(x)− λ(x)]dx = (9.30)
F (ζ∗j)[ω(ζ∗j)− λ(ζ∗j)]− F (bζ∗)[ω(bζ∗)− λ(bζ∗)]− ζ∗jZ
bζ∗
F (x)[ω0(x)− λ0(x)]dx.
Substituting (9.30) into (9.29), we obtain
F (ζ∗j)b(ζ∗j) = (9.31)
F (bζ∗)b(bζ∗)− F (bζ∗)[ω(bζ∗)− λ(bζ∗)] + F (ζ∗j)[ω(ζ∗j)− λ(ζ∗j)]− ζ∗jZ
bζ∗
F (x)[ω0(x)− λ0(x)]dx.
Solving (9.31) for b(ζ∗j) we obtain
b(ζ∗j) = (9.32)
F (bζ∗)
F (ζ∗j)
b(bζ∗)− F (bζ∗)
F (ζ∗j)
[ω(bζ∗)− λ(bζ∗)] + [ω(ζ∗j)− λ(ζ∗j)]− 1
F (ζ∗j)
ζ∗jZ
bζ∗
F (x)[ω0(x)− λ0(x)]dx.
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This equation indicates a relationship between ω(bζ∗) and λ(bζ∗).
We next differentiate the bidding function in (9.32). We find that
b
0
(ζ∗j) = (9.33)
F
0
(ζ∗j)
(F (ζ∗j))2
{−F (bζ∗)b(bζ∗) + F (bζ∗)[ω(bζ∗)− λ(bζ∗)] + ζ∗jZ
bζ∗
F (x)[ω0(x)− λ0(x)]dx}.
Notice that, if
ω(bζ∗)− b(bζ∗) = λ(bζ∗), (9.34)
so that type bζ∗ were indifferent between trading (locally) winning and losing
events, as was true in our equilibrium for ζ∗ in the basic auction, then the first
two terms in (9.33) would cancel, and it would follow directly from (9.33) that
b
0 ≥ 0. But (9.34) does not hold here; rather, we have that b(bζ∗) satisfies (9.28).
Imposing (9.28), we use (9.33) to write
b
0
(ζ∗j) = (9.35)
F
0
(ζ∗j)
(F (ζ∗j))2
{F (bζ∗)[η(bζ∗)− λ(bζ∗)] + ζ∗jZ
bζ∗
F (x)[ω0(x)− λ0(x)]dx}.
But using (9.35), we see that
b
0
(bζ∗) = F 0(bζ∗)
F (bζ∗) [η(bζ∗)− λ(bζ∗)] < 0. (9.36)
But (9.36) contradicts the possibility assumed above that b(bζ∗) = bH and, for all
ζ∗j > bζ∗, b(ζ∗j) > bH and b is strictly increasing. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 7.1:To show thatWNR−2P (bo) > F 2(eζ∗)WNR+[1−F 2(eζ∗)]WR
for any ζH ≥ 1, we first rewrite this inequality as
[1− F 2(eζ∗)]∆
4
ζH > bo[F 2(ζ
∗
)− F 2(eζ∗)] + 2 2Z
ζ
∗
F (ζ){[ω(ζ)− λ(ζ)]F 0(ζ)− ∆
4
(1− F (ζ))}dζ.
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If this inequality holds for any ζ∗ and eζ∗ consistent with A4 when ζH is set to one
and bo is set to its maximal permissible level under A4 (i.e., ω(2) − λ(2)), then
it must hold for ζH ≥ 1 for any bo satisfying A4. Hence, setting ζH to one and
setting bo ≡ ω(2)−λ(2) = ∆4 (1−(4τ o+2∆)), the above inequality can be written,
after some manipulation, as
2Z
ζ
∗
F (ζ)F 0(ζ)[2− ζ]dζ + [1− F 2(eζ)](2τ o +∆) > 0 > − 2Z
ζ
∗
F (ζ)[1− F (ζ)]dζ.
Therefore,WNR−2P (bo) > F 2(eζ∗)WNR+[1−F 2(eζ∗)]WR for any ζH ≥ 1. Q.E.D.
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